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The role of international organizations grows with the acceleration of globalization and 
the increasing importance of global governance. However, thus far, only limited and 
rather narrow research has been generated on the subject. It is a state of affairs that 
reflects on international studies, as well as on the power realities of the world. By 
assessing international organizations through the career prospects that they offer to 
skilled professionals, this paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. As such it unveils 
some of the internal dynamics of international organizations and explores their external 
consequences in terms of the relations between international organizations, the people 
employed by these, and the power play (economic, social, political and even cultural) at 
the national and international level. 
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   1
The role of international organizations grows with the acceleration of globalization and 
the increasing importance of global governance. However, thus far, only limited and 
rather narrow research has been generated on the subject. It is a state of affairs that 
reflects on international studies, as well as on the power realities of the world. While 
international relations have traditionally focused on more political issues (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004) and international law as an external description of international 
organizations, the internal analysis of international organizations, especially in terms of 
human resources, remains rather limited.1 The failure to address more prosaic 
institutional and organizational aspects that are of equal significance has left the study 
of international organizations as a profession, and as a workplace, suffering from a 
striking lack of research.2 
This paper is an attempt to bring some clarity to the understanding of the internal 
dynamics of international organizations by examining why they are an attractive 
workplace to professionals with skills marketable both internationally and nationally. 
This is also to provide a better understanding of the links between international 
organizations, the people employed by these, and the distribution of power (economic, 
social, political and even cultural) at the national and international level. Against this 
background this paper proceeds in four steps. First, it takes note of the limited amount 
of research conducted on the professional culture in international organizations and 
explains why this is the case. Second, it examines what leads people to join international 
organizations (including how they envision their work). Third, it shows that the 
marketability of international organizations and of the professionals working for them is 
an indicator of the power relations at the national and international level, and the place 
that international organizations occupy in these. Moreover, this section reflects on the 
socio-economic and educational profiles of international civil servants. Fourth, and 
finally, this paper draws some lessons from the analysis of the mobility of professionals 
in the context of international organizations and reflects on the questions that the 
findings leave pending for further research.  
I – From the state of the field to the state of the world 
Why is the research conducted on the professional culture of international organizations 
so limited when they themselves are no recent phenomena? What does this indicate for 
the studies of international relations and for the power realities of the world? 
The study of international organizations and their professionals  
The fact that historically the study of international organizations has been only a sub-
field of international studies has limited the understanding that we have of them. A 
                                                 
1   A sample of good academic studies on the international civil service include: Krosney (1967); Jordan 
(1972); Weiss (1975); McLaren (1980); Beigbeder (1988, 1996); Mouritzen (1990); Cooker (1990); 
Dijkzeul (1997); Barnet and Finnemore (2004); Udom (2003); Vaubel et al. (2003). 
2   It is not only in academia that prosaic aspects of international organizations are overlooked. At the UN 
itself, traditionally, the strategic importance of human resources as well as of public information and 
statistics has not been acknowledged sufficiently.   2
neglect of the more practical issues has limited both the internal and external analyses of 
international organizations, especially in terms of human resources. 
Traditionally in international relations, the amount of research conducted on 
international organizations, its resources, prestige and prospects, have been lower than 
for issues such as security and foreign policy. And those few scholars who have taken a 
strong interest in international organizations have tended to be captives of mainstream 
perspectives. With a focus on political questions, international organizations have been 
largely approached with state-centered lenses. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004) point 
out, while many scholars have shown that there is more to international life than great 
power realpolitik, and that enduring cooperation is possible with a little help from 
international institutions, ‘they couched their argument within a statist framework 
borrowed from neo-realists that gave short shrift to international organizations as 
independent actors’. These scholars were interested in the ‘principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures’ that governed state action’. 
Mainstream international law has hardly been more successful in giving a satisfactory 
account of international organizations. The way in which international organizations are 
taught and researched by law faculties, merely tends to describe their functioning and 
activities from an external point of view according to the United Nations charter, 
international norms and institutional mandates. With recent developments of 
international law, scholars indicate attempts to go beyond this state of affairs. This is 
especially the case in the United States where, for instance, the adoption of an 
interdisciplinary approach bringing together international law and international 
relations, attempts to redefine the study of international organizations (Slaughter et al. 
1998; see also Goldstein et al. 2000). This is equally true in the European context, as 
illustrated by the European Journal of International Law’s efforts to promote critical 
and theoretical, and at times sociological, perspectives on international organizations 
(Chimni 2004). Nevertheless, these attempts of renewal tend to leave the inner workings 
of international organizations by and large unattended. 
Moreover, the lack of a first-hand knowledge that characterizes the scholarship on 
international organizations does not help. Despite the growing interaction between 
academia and international organizations, few academics have a substantial inside 
knowledge of international organizations and, a significant gap remains between the 
two. This makes studies on international organizations somewhat external, 
‘desincarnated’.3 Furthermore, if certain progress has been made in this domain, the 
data available on the practical aspects of international organizations, and the access to it, 
is far from perfect. This is particularly true for human resources. 
Over the past years, the improved collections of quantitative data of departments of 
human resources of international organizations have allowed a better overview of the 
workforce and of the various aspects of working conditions. This is a welcome 
complement to the studies on human resources that have until now been conducted on a 
                                                 
3   A first step towards addressing this shortcoming would be to allow and even encourage more 
academics to spend a sabbatical as scholar-in-residence in strategic departments of international 
organizations, and more scholarly-minded international civil servants taking time-off in universities or 
think tanks to reflect and write on their practical experience in an academic context.   3
regular,4 or ad hoc basis. Also, data has become more accessible through information 
made available on the international organizations websites,5 or on the websites of the 
national ministries of foreign affairs.6 Yet, significant shortcomings are still at work. 
Although some organizations do better than others, data collection is not as systematic 
as it should be. For instance, socio-economic and educational backgrounds of the 
professionals of international organizations are difficult to trace. Moreover, there is a 
lack of homogeneity in the collection of data from one organization to another.7 This 
makes it difficult to come up with reliable and coherent figures. As for access, progress 
has not amounted to total transparency. If the information made public on websites is 
helpful, it is still very limited. In addition, researchers face substantial problems in 
conducting interviews with human resources, even compared to accessing people who 
deal with politically sensitive matters.8 
Distribution of power and international organizations as a profession 
In mainstream international studies, the methodological challenges of analyzing the 
working conditions of international organizations are further impeded by the power 
distribution at play. This leads international organizations to be considered secondary 
institutions, and the examination of human resources, of marginal importance.  
In developing countries, international organizations are often among the more powerful 
actors. The impact that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its adjustment 
policies, the World Bank and its loan policies, the United Nations and its humanitarian-
peacekeeping and reconstruction interventions can have on countries in crises, 
illustrates this. However in the developed world, international organizations rank only 
as secondary powers. This is especially the case in Western democracies. While the 
commanding position of Western democracies in the international distribution of power 
enables them to underwrite international organizations financially, normatively and 
                                                 
4   See the work of the International Civil Service Commission on the United Nations system (excluding 
Bretton Woods institutions) on human resources issues, http://icsc.un.org. On the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), refer for instance to Lahti (2004). 
5   Also, as part of their efforts for further openness and transparency, the World Bank and the IMF have 
made efforts in recent years to liberalize their policy on access to archives; see World Bank (2002) 
and IMF (2003). On the other hand, the United Nations’ archives policy has not changed since 1984. 
See UN (1984, 2002). 
6   National governments seem particularly eager to facilitate access of information to nationals who  
wish to work for international organizations. See for example to the website of the French Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/ministere_817/emplois-stages-concours_825/ 
emplois-dans-les-organisations-internationales_4338/mission-fonctionnaires-internationaux_4339/ 
notre-mission_11109.html, section ‘guide pratique’). 
7   From one organization to another, the criteria of classification and collection of data often vary. That 
is also the case from one country to another. In addition, especially in developing countries, data tends 
to be either missing or unreliable. All this makes it challenging to paint a credible and realistic overall 
picture. On the importance of good statistical tools for the conduct on public policy in general see the 
historical study of Rothschild (2002). 
8   One is left wondering whether such difficulty of access is caused by issues of confidentiality, by a 
lack of transparency, professionalism, resources or all of the above.   4
politically, it also renders international organizations relatively negligible and 
instrumental to them. 
This situation encourages a gradual growth of international organizations under Western 
influence, which also takes a toll on the scholarship on international organizations. In 
the Western context, the way in which academic research has overlooked the need to 
study international organizations, and more specifically the influence of the professional 
culture on the functioning and work of these organizations, can be explained by two 
ways in which power impacts scholarship. First, it is more attractive to analyze objects 
that are at the center of power than objects in the margins of power;9 second, the study 
of power is shaped by the very power that it examines.10 
Yet, the professionals of international organizations are not foreign to power and an 
analysis of these professionals can improve the understanding of international 
organizations and how they participate in power. As a matter of fact, as will be seen in 
the following sections, assessing international organizations through the career 
prospects they offer to highly skilled professionals is quite instructive. Especially as it 
unveils how power is at work in the professional dimension of international 
organizations and as such, offers valuable insights on three related and complementary 
levels, the: 
i)  distribution and dynamics of power (economic, political and cultural) within 
international organizations;  
ii)  interplay between national and international power (economic, political, and 
cultural); and  
iii)  incidence that this interplay has on the power (economic, political and cultural) 
of institutions and actors, both at the national and international level. 
II – Professional attractiveness of international organizations 
To grasp the attractiveness of international organizations to skilled professionals three 
questions will be considered: First, what is the magnitude of international staff in 
international organizations, coming both from developed and developing countries? 
Second, what are the differentials of financial benefits among international 
organizations, as well as among national governments, universities and the private 
sector, in developed and developing countries respectively? And what role do these 
differentials play in the migration of professionals? Third, beyond financial motivations, 
what factors (such as exposure to an international environment, interaction with 
qualified peers and career development) have an impact on, and to what extent do they 
influence, the decision of professionals to join international organizations? 
                                                 
9   One could add that an object which is closely linked with power is easier to study because of its 
greater visibility. Its influence on reality is identifiable, including through records. 
10  A significant part of the epistemology and methodology of the sciences of social reality (including 
history, economics, and sociology) is about ensuring their credibility by trying to be as little as 
possible the captive of the trappings of power.   5
Magnitude of international staff in international organizations 
To account for the magnitude of international staff in international organizations, it is 
necessary in a first instance to focus on who is employed by international organizations, 
and on what their origins are in terms of developed and developing regions and 
countries. 
Multiplication of international organizations – With the widening and deepening of 
global governance and globalization, the number of international organizations is 
growing to cover more and more sectors; some organizations being more important than 
others. At the most basic level, an international organization is an institution established 
through an agreement made by three or more states, with a permanent secretariat that 
performs ongoing tasks. The United States’ Federal Government’s Human Resources 
Agency (n.d.) identifies five main categories of international organizations: i) United 
Nations with its subsidiary bodies, organs, and programs;11 ii) UN specialized 
agencies;12 iii) international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank 
Group;13 iv) regional organizations including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
the European Union (EU); and finally, v) other international organizations including the 
Fund for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage 
Fund), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) formerly 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
In 2005, the staff employed by the United Nations Secretariat, its most significant 
subsidiary programs, funds, and organs worldwide amounted to 40,074 distributed 
between the entities as shown in Table 1. Furthermore, a recent study conducted by 
Vaubel et al. (2003) presented numbers on the staff of 27 international organizations 
(see Table 2). 
With the 73,660 staff in international organizations and those 40.074 of the United 
Nations, considering how many other international organizations there are, one could 
estimate that the total of people working for international organizations worldwide 
could amount to approximately 140,000. 
 
                                                 
11  The United Nations Secretariat, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Program (UNDP), 
UN Environmental Program (UNEP), UN High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), UN Office of 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UN University (UNU), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
World Food Program (WFP). 
12   Examples are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), International Labor Organization (ILO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). 
13 Additional examples include the UN Regional Development Banks (with the African Development 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)), the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA).   6
Table 1: Staff of the United Nations Secretariat and other entities, as at 30 June 2005 
Entity Regular  budget  Extrabudgetary 
resources 
Total 
UN Secretariat  7 753  8 236  15 989 
UNDP    5 542  5 542 
UNFPA    1 342  1 342 
UNHCR  219  6 420  6 639 
UNICEF    8 981  8 981 
UNITAR   35  35 
UNOPS   978  978 
UNRWA 102  36  138 
ITC   213  213 
ICSC   36  36 
UNJSPF   155  155 
ICJ 84  14  98 
UNU   121  121 
Total  8 158  31 916  40 074 
Notes:  These figures refer to staff in appointments of one year or more. The entities specified include 
the UN Secretariat, UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Institute for Training 
and Research (UNITAR), UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UN Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO 
(ITC), International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), UN Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF), 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), UN University (UNU). For a more detailed table see Annex 1. 
Source:  UN (2005a: 9). 
 
 
Geographical breakdown of international staff in international organizations – Given 
the difficulties in obtaining information and data on the human resources of 
international organizations, this paper mainly focuses on three international 
organizations, the World Bank Group, the IMF, and more specifically, the United 
Nations. 
Of the UN Secretariat, as of 30 June 2005, out of the total of 15,989 staff with 
appointments for one year or more, only 2,58114 were recruited under the system of 
geographical distribution.15 
                                                 
14   Several categories of staff are excluded including staff appointed to the secretariats of subsidiary 
programs, funds and organs, with special status; staff appointed to peacekeeping posts, specifically 
funded for other field mission service or financed under the support account for peacekeeping 
operations; staff in the Field Service and the General Service and related categories of staff locally 
recruited; staff appointed to technical cooperation project posts (UN 2005a: 10). 
15  The number of staff that each member state is entitled to have in virtue of the system of geographical 
distribution is based on a scale of assessments, i.e. on the financial contribution of each member state 
to the regular UN budget.   7
Table 2: Staff size and the number of member states, 27 international organizations 
Organization Year  Staff 
ADB 2000  2  058 
BIS 2000  500 
CARICOM 2000  221 
CoE 2000  1  216 
EC/EU 2000  30  777 
ESA 2000  1  718 
FAO 1999  4  072 
GATT/WTO 2001  368 
IAEA 2000  2  136 
IBRD 1998  6  800 
ICAO 2000  759 
IFAD 2000  265 
IFC 2001  1  063 
ILO 1999  2  393 
IMCO/IMO 2000  274 
IMF 2001  2  976 
ITU 1999  770 
OECD 2001  2  291 
UNESCO 1999  2  348 
UNHCR 2000  5  423 
UPU 2000  151 
WHO 1999  4  000 
WIPO 2001  817 
WMO 1999  264 
Total 1998-2001  73  660 
Notes:    UNHCR is already listed in Table 1. The staff figures cover the following international 
organizations: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
Caribbean Common Market Secretariat (CARICOM), Council of Europe (CoE), European 
Community/European Union (EC/EU), European Space Agency (ESA), Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization 
(GATT/WTO), International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA), International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
International Labor Organization (ILO), International Maritime (Co-operation) Organization 
(IMCO/IMO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Transport Organization (ITU), 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Health Organization (WHO), World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO). For a 
more detailed table see Annex 2. 
Source:  Vaubel et al. (2003: 8). 
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Table 3: Distribution of staff subject to geographical distribution among developing and 
developed countries and countries with economies in transition (2001-2005) 






midpoint %  No. %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Developing 








(14) 52.7  22  (4)  55.0 






(46)  46.6 
55  
(14)  50.5 23  (4)  56.1 






(52)  45.0 
54  
(14)  46.2 23  (4)  56.1 






(55)  44.7 
56  
(17)  48.7 20  (3)  51.3 








(17) 45.4  17  (5)  41.5 
Developed 






(53)  45.2 
46  
(10)  41.1 15  (3)  37.5 






(59)  46.9 
47  
(13)  43.1 15  (3)  36.6 








(18) 47.9  15  (4)  36.6 






(64)  46.5 
52  
(18)  45.2 16  (6)  41.0 






(61)  46.8 
50  
(17)  46.3 21  (6)  51.2 
Countries with 
economies in 
transition   2001  157-213  185.1  7.1  264 (52)  10.9 (5.3) 17 (3)  5.2  7 (1)  6.3  3 (1)  7.5 
  2002  162-220  191.0  7.1  267 (53)  10.8 (5.2) 21 (3)  6.5  7 (1)  6.4  3 (1)  7.3 
  2003  161-218  189.9  7.0  262 (55)  10.5 (5.3) 27 (3)  8.1  7 (1)  6.0  3 (1)  7.3 
  2004  162-219  190.0  7.0  258 (56)  10.3 (5.3) 29 (2)  8.8  7 (1)  6.1  3 (1)  7.7 
  2005  167-226  196.8  7.0  262 (61)  10.2 (5.5) 34 (3)  10.3  9 (1)  8.3  3 (1)  7.3 






(106)  100.0 
112  
(25)  100.0 40  (8)  100.0 








(28) 100.0  41  (8)  100.0 






(111)  100.0 
117  
(33)  100.0 41  (9)  100.0 






(121)  100.0 
115  
(36)  100.0 39  (10) 100.0 








(35) 100.0  41  (12) 100.0 
Notes:  See Annex 3 for the distribution of posts in the UN Secretariat subject to geographical 
distribution according to nationality, grade, and gender. 
Source:  UN (2005a: 17) 
 
 
Table 3 provides the numbers for the UN Secretariat staff from developing and 
developed countries as well as for countries with economies in transition. It also 
includes the representation of member states at the senior and policy making levels. 
Beyond the posts subject to geographical distribution, as a whole (including all 
categories – directors, professionals, and general service staff), 24 of the 191 Member 
States in 2005 occupied more than 72.2 percent of all Secretariat staff, each state with 
more than 100 staff members. For example Ethiopia, France, Kenya, the Philippines, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, all had more than 400 nationals in the 
Secretariat. Moreover, including General Service staff from those states that host UN   9
facilities, headquarters, offices, or regional commissions (Austria, Chile, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lebanon, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States of America) will further 
increase their representation. Including all staff categories, 177 of the 191 member 
states were represented compared to  174 in the posts subject to geographical 
distribution. 14 Member States remained unrepresented.16 
Turning to the staff of the World Bank Group, according to its Annual Report 2005 
approximately 8,700 staff from 164 countries were posted in more than 100 locations 
worldwide (World Bank 2006). Internal geographical distribution of the Bank is 
categorized according to primarily economic standing as Part I and Part II member 
countries. Part I countries are by and large developed countries, almost all donors to the 
International Development Association (IDA), who pay contributions in freely 
convertible currencies.17 Part II countries, essentially developing countries, may be 
donors and are entitled to pay most of their contributions in local currencies.18 In 2004, 
nationals of Part I countries accounted for 39 percent of all staff, and 63 percent of 
management and senior technical positions. Nationals of Part II countries accounted for 
61 percent of all staff and 37 percent of management and senior technical positions. The 





                                                 
16    Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Comoros, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall islands, Monaco, Nauru, 
Palau, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and United Arabs Emirates. (UN 
2005a: 28). 
17  For more information, and for statement of voting power, and subscriptions and contributions of IDA 
Members, see ‘Financial Statements’ (World Bank 2006). 
18  List of Part I and Part II IDA member countries: Part I members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States. Part II members: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lao  People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, former 
Yugoslav Republic Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Republic of Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. http://web.worldbank.org   10
Table 4: Geographic distribution of staff at the IMF by developing and industrial countries, 2004 
Staff Number  Percent 
All staff  2 714  100.0 
Developing countries  1 187  43.7 
Industrial countries  1 527  56.3 
Total Support Staff (Grades A1-A8)  718 100.0 
Developing countries  394  54.9 
Industrial countries  324  45.1 
Total Professional Staff (Grades A9-A15)  1 633  100.0 
Developing countries  682  41.8 
Industrial countries  951  58.2 
Total Managerial Staff (B1-B5)  363 100.0 
Developing countries  111  30.6 
Industrial countries  252  69.4 
Notes:  A9-A15 levels correspond to professional staff, B1-B5 levels correspond to more senior and 
managerial positions. As for A1-A8 levels, they are support staff, normally recruited locally 
except under particular circumstances (e.g., language skills requirements). However, within the 
local job market, efforts are made to recruit as diverse support staff as possible. For a more 
detailed table including 1990s data see Annex 4. 
Source:  IMF (2005: 89). 
 
For the IMF, the Diversity Annual Report 2003 (Lahti 2004: 15-18) presents the 
distribution of its staff from its 141 member-states between developing and 
industrialized countries (see Table 4). In difference from the World Bank this 
categorization is based on financial criteria considering aggregated purchasing power 
parity (PPP), valued gross domestic product (GDP), exports, and population, but also on 
analytical criteria taking into matters of sustainability such as source of export and 
institutional structures.19 
Beginning with Africa, in 2004, the 190 staff from this region, despite its 0.6 percent 
increase in the past five years, represented only 7 percent of the total number of IMF 
staff. This representation was increasingly concentrated in the lowest grade group, 
support staff (A1-A8) with 10.3 percent. Since 2000, the African representation in the 
next grade group, professional staff (A9–A15), experienced an increase from 6.1 to 6.3 
percent, while the managerial staff (B1-B5) had deteriorated from 3.8 to 3.6 percent. As 
a result, the share of African economists in the higher grades was among the lowest of 
all regions. 
                                                 
19  However, the IMF is increasingly referring to a division of countries into two major groups, advanced 
economies, and other emerging market and developing countries, each divided into a number of 
subgroups. For more information see IMF (2006: 165- ), and especially the statistical appendix.   11
The Middle Eastern countries, especially the Arab countries, also suffered from a 
chronic under representation with only 111 Middle Eastern staff compared to 115 in 
2003, representing 4.1 percent of the total IMF staff. Only 67 of these were Arab staff, 
which is as low as 2.4 percent IMF wide. Overall, the Middle Eastern countries were 
unevenly represented, with Pakistan having the largest representation, especially in the 
B grades, comprising 23 percent of all Middle Eastern staff IMF-wide, followed by 
Lebanon and Egypt. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Libya were highly underrepresented. In 
contrast to the African region, the Middle Eastern representation was stronger in the 
higher grades. 
The representation of transition countries (former communist countries) on the other 
hand had been steadily increasing to a total of 129 staff members in 2004, representing 
4.8 percent of the total IMF staff; 5.9 percent of the professional staff, and 0.8 percent 
of the managerial staff (three staff). Representation was higher in what the IMF calls the 
‘economist career stream’ than in the ‘specialized career streams’20. During the past 
five years, 52 candidates were hired from the region (compared to 11 in 2004), 
accounting for 6.7 percent of all recruitment. However, none of whom were hired in the 
managerial grades. The European transition countries comprised 16 percent of Europe’s 
representation IMF wide (2 percent in the managerial grades) compared to the UK staff 
that alone comprised 19 percent of Europe’s representation (32 percent in the 
managerial grades) IMF wide. 
The 16.6 percent representation of the Asian region, was close to the regional quota of 
18 percent, but unevenly distributed between India, Australia, New Zealand on the one 
hand, and the East Asian countries (ASEAN+3)21 on the other. The most 
overrepresented country, especially in the B grades, was India with 28 percent of the 
Asian region’s representation and 4.7 percent IMF wide. IMF wide, the representation 
of the ASEAN+3 countries was 8.4 percent, and in the managerial grades, only 3.9 
percent. The East Asian staff  represented 51 percent of the  Asian region’s 
representation, and IMF wide, East Asia accounted for 28 percent of the managerial 
staff.  
For the Western Hemisphere, United States and Canadian staff comprised 67 percent of 
all Western nationals IMF wide, and 74 percent in the managerial grades. As for states 
other than the US and Canada, Peruvian staff comprised 18 percent of all other staff 
from this region, the Brazilian staff accounted for 13 percent and finally, Argentinean 
staff represented 12 percent of this group’s representation IMF wide (but 28 percent in 
the managerial grades) (Lahti 2004: 18). 
 
                                                 
20 The ‘economist career stream’ refers to staff members employed as economists, by far the largest 
professional group within the staff. The ‘specialized career streams’ refer to non-economist positions 
such as the department of human resources’ staff, library staff, secretaries, etc. 
21 ASAEN+3 includes Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Lao (PDR), Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (Lahti 2004: table 22, p. 57).   12
Differentials in financial benefits 
In light of the fact that differentials in financial benefits are generally considered critical 
to the decision of professionals to migrate internationally, what are these differentials in 
the context of international organizations? Where do they stand in comparison to 
financial benefits offered by national civil services, the private sector and universities in 
developed and developing countries? 
Financial benefits of international organizations – The financial benefits of 
international organizations are not limited to salaries. They can include dependency 
benefits, education grants, rental subsidies, pensions, family-visit travels, annual leave 
and other.22 However, for the sake of simplicity, and because they constitute a strong 
sample of analysis, the focus will mainly be on salaries. 
When it comes to the UN, specific remuneration systems are applied to the general 
service (support staff) and related locally recruited staff, as well as to the field service 
(in particular peace-keeping mission staff). But since the professional and higher 
categories are generally considered to set the common system of salary, the focus 
should be on these. The salary of the professional staff of the higher categories is made 
of two main elements: a base or floor (minimum) salary23 and a post adjustment, both 
expressed in US dollars. Post adjustment, as an integral part of the salary, is a cost-of-
living adjustment designed to preserve equivalent purchasing power for all duty 
stations.24 It represents a significant addition to the base salary. For instance, as of 
January 2006, a D1 post, the post of a principal officer, in step 1 (out of 15 possible 
steps) without dependants in New York had a base salary of USD 83,587. To this base 
salary in New York a post-adjustment of USD 53,244 is added, whereas in Tokyo, one 
of the most expensive cities in the world, the post-adjustment amounted to USD 
74,141.25 
                                                 
22   The United Nations General Assembly decided that UN staff should be tax exempt from national 
income taxation. A few member states tax the emoluments of their nationals but in these cases the 
organization reimburses the income tax to these staff member. Therefore all international civil 
servants are subject to the payment of a staff assessment comparable to a national income tax. Staff 
assessment is paid to ensure that the net salary of each staff is the same. For more on these benefits, 
see  United Nations Common System of Salaries, Allowances and Benefits, 
http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/sal/sabeng03.pdf 
23  Salary scales of UN professional staff and its specialized agencies are determined by comparing the 
salaries of professional staff working in New York with the salaries of US civil servants in 
Washington DC, plus a small differential or margin taking expatriation (about 90 percent of 
professional staff in the UN system work outside the home country) into account. The practice of 
basing the salaries of international civil servants on those of a comparator civil service arose in 1921 
when the League of Nations decided that to recruit highly qualified staff, representative of its member 
states, the salary scale for internationally-recruited professional staff should compare favorably to the 
highest paid national civil service. Since that time, the Noblemaire Principle has served as 
the rationale underlying the salary system. In 1921, the comparator was the British civil service. Since 
the founding of the UN in 1946, one of the best paid national civil services has been that of the USA. 
24  Differences in living costs are measured through periodic place-to-place surveys conducted at all duty 
stations. The surveys measure the cost-of-living of the duty station in relation to the cost-of-living at 
the base of the system (New York) to create a post-adjustment index for each duty station. 
25  Post-adjustment  calculated  according to the ‘Consolidated Post Adjustment Circular’, 
ICSC/CIRC/PAC/377, International Civil Service Commission, New York, United Nations, 1 May   13
The financial benefits of international organizations show some differentials. 
Traditionally, the salaries of professionals at the World Bank and the IMF are in general 
significantly higher than those of the United Nations. Salaries in these organizations are 
adjusted not only to the US public sector, but also to the salaries offered by the private 
financial and industrial firms. Different classification of posts complicates the 
comparison of salaries across these organizations, as does the difference of benefits and 
post-adjustment as well as times of reference for data. Yet, taking the minimum salary 
of each position under the highest directing role in each of these three organizations 
from three reports published within the same twelve months, one can compare the 
following minimal salaries: the United Nations, assistant-secretary general (ASG/I) 
(1 January 2005) – USD 172 860; the IMF, department director (B5) (1 May 2005) – 
USD 234 350; and the World Bank, managing directors and senior vice presidents (K) 
(1 July 2004) – USD 242 500.26 For a more detailed salary structure of each of these 
three organizations, see Annex 5. 
Comparing the financial benefits of international organizations with national civil 
services – Although great disparities exist in between national  civil  services, the 
financial differences between international organizations and national civil services 
generally exceed those of between international organizations significantly. 
Traditionally the salaries of international organizations are calculated according to the 
best paid national civil service (UN 2005b: 39-57). Needless to say, this means that 
compared to the national civil service of developing countries, the financial benefits 
associated with a career in an international organization are considerable. The figures in 
Table 8 presenting the yearly average government employee wage of sample countries 
are a useful indication, although to be interpreted with caution. 
The differences of financial benefits between international organizations and the 
national civil services of developed countries are less clear. Surely, the post adjustment 
makes the overall UN salary (base salary and post-adjustment) more attractive 
financially than most salaries in the national administrations of developed countries. But 
when one compares international organizations’ salaries with the total cash 
remuneration of national civil service expatriates (base salaries and allowance of 
expatriation), especially in the foreign service, the differentials turn to the advantage of 
developed countries, where expatriation benefits are substantially better.27 
                                                                                                                                               
2006, in relation to the United Nations ‘Salary scale for staff in the Professional and higher categories, 
showing annual gross salaries and net equivalents after application of staff assessment’, Effective 
1 January 2006. 
26   See the International Civil Service Commission, http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/sad/ss/sal0501.pdf, 
IMF (2005: 87), and World Bank (2006). 
27    Although not an organization included in this paper, the findings of a comparative study of the 
remuneration of the European institutions are quite clear: ‘The net remuneration levels of the British, 
Italian and Danish Permanent Representations are generally above that of the EU institutions. At the 
French Permanent Representation the remuneration level is higher, or at about the same level, as that 
at the EU for most of the grades. The calculated average remuneration is in the range of 85-119 
percent of the net remuneration of the EU for single staff and 98-135 percent for married staff’ (PLS 
Ramboll Management 2000: 12).   14
Table 8: Average government employee wage in sample countries 
Country  Average government wage, 1997 price (USD)  Year 
Argentina 15  000  1996-2000 
China 965  1996-2000 
Colombia 6  095  1991-95 
Egypt 4  125  1991-95 
India 2  090  1996-2000 
Indonesia 1  375  1996-2000 
Jordan 4  230  1996-2000 
Kenya 1  690  1991-95 
Lebanon 5  670  1991-95 
Mexico 4  700  1996-2000 
Morocco 4  895  1991-95 
Pakistan 1  220  1996-2000 
Russian Federation  1 520  1991-95 
Notes:  This table presents the average annual government wage during the 1990s in US dollars. 
Although incomplete, these figures give an idea of salaries of civil services in developing 
countries and allow a comparison with the salaries of international organizations. The data 
comes from the World Bank’s Public Sector Employment and Wages Database, and was 
prepared by Giulio de Tommaso and Amit Mukherjee during 2000-01. It is available at 
http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/. The wage figures, originally in Local Currency Unit 
(LCU), have been converted into US dollars for the sake of comparison. The wage figures of 
1997 have been converted according to the rate of 1 January 1997. See also Civil Service 
Systems in Comparative Perspective (1997), papers presented at Indiana University, 
Bloomington, Indiana, 5-8 April 1997, unpublished. The papers presented at this conference are 




Financial differentials between international organizations and universities – When it 
comes to the financial differentials between international organizations and universities, 
again, academic salaries are much lower in developing countries than in developed 
countries, leaving the former unable to compete with the latter.28 The figures in Table 9 
give an estimate of academic salaries in developed countries. 
 
                                                 
28    For academics’ working conditions and salaries in developing countries, see World Bank (2000:   
23-4).   15

















































University  66 459  95 996  135 379  103 380  169 839  2006 
USA Harvard
e  82 900  92 300  163 200  -  -  2004-05 
USA Yale
e  69 400  82 100  145 600  -  -  2004-05 
USA Princeton
e  73 400  95 500  151 100  -  -  2004-05 
USA Stanford
e  82 000  103 000  148 600  -  -  2004-05 
USA Berkeley
e  71 300  77 700  121 800  -  -  2004-05 
Notes:  * Converted from local currencies to USD at the rate of 1 February 2006. 
Sources:  
a   French Ministry of Education, http://www.education.gouv.fr/personnel/metiers/default.htm 
b   Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University, Japan, ‘Table 21: Salaries for 
Faculty (Academic staff) in Private Universities’, Statistics of Japanese Higher Education, 
http://en.rihe.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/data_list.php. 
c   Update (December 2004). Washington, DC: National Education Association, (10)5, p.  2, 
http://www2.nea.org/he/heupdate/vol10no5.pdf. 
d   National University of Singapore at http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/is/nus_life.htm 
e   Faculty Salary Survey 2005, compiled by American Association of University Professors, 
available on the website of the Chronicle of Higher Education, http://chronicle.com/stats/aaup/. 
 
As illustrated, the comparison between salaries in international organizations and 
salaries in academia in developed countries tends to favor international organizations. 
There are of course exceptions, especially in the United States. The competitive 
character of the academic job market and the willingness and ability of top American 
universities to provide high salaries for world-class experts lead them to offer 
unparalleled financial benefits. This is particularly the case for academic fields that 
compete with the private sector, such as science, technology, economics or business. In 
addition, for especially more senior academic staff in the United States, there are a 
number of additional substantive income revenues including speaking fees, consulting 
work, royalties, research grants, etc., on which little data is available. But, as a whole,   16
the average academic salary in developed countries is not as high  as the one in 
international organizations. 
International organizations and the private sector – When comparing the differentials 
of financial benefits in international organizations to the private sector, it makes sense to 
focus on companies with an international reach. Somewhat similar to international 
organizations vis-à-vis national administrations, these call upon a task force with 
advanced skills (including language skills) that perform well internationally. At times, 
also somewhat reminiscent of international organizations vis-à-vis the national civil 
service, their international character gives them a reputation edge over companies 
confined to the national realm. In addition, the structure of the financial benefits that 
they offer, including expatriation packages, echoes that of international organizations. 
In this regard, the private sector offers better financial benefits than international 
organizations. This is why the salaries of the private sector serve as a benchmark for the 
salaries of financial international organizations to ensure the attraction of the best 
professionals available on the job market. Needless to say, also in the private sector 
there are large disparities at play.  
Incidentally, higher salaries of the private sector are accompanied by a strong 
marketability of accomplished professionals from the private sector vis-à-vis 
international organizations. This is especially the case for financial international 
organizations, where solid academic credentials and a first-hand experience on 
economic issues are valued. To a certain extent, this is also the case for the United 
Nations. The good reputation that the private sector can have in terms of dynamism, 
efficiency and good management of resources is viewed as an asset, not only by 
organizations that deal with economic development (UNDP for example; see UNDP 
2004), but also by the areas of the United Nations in need of institutional and 
operational improvement, such as human resources and management. The difficulty for 
professionals to re-enter the private sector after an experience in international 
organizations gives an indicator of the marketability of international organizations vis-à-
vis the private sector. In this regard, one has to admit that the marketability of the UN 
system is not very high. A former private sector professional who at mid-level career 
stays at the United Nations for a long period of time, risks facing considerable 
difficulties when re-entering the private sector. The damaged reputation of the UN in 
terms of management and ability to deliver taints the marketability of its workforce 
outside the UN.29 As for the international financial institutions, while their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the private sector is far better than the United Nations’, 
arguably, the marketability of the World Bank and the IMF in the private sector is also 
lower than the one of the private sector vis-à-vis the World Bank and the IMF. 
Examining other factors of professional attractiveness of international 
organizations 
Beyond financial incentives, what role does working in an environment that is in 
principle dedicated to the public good, and its career opportunities, have on the desire of 
skilled professionals to join and stay with international organizations? 
                                                 
29  All the more true for someone who has led an entire career at the United Nations.   17
International public service as a stimulating professional environment – The prospect 
of working for international organizations in an environment that combines concerns for 
the global public good with an interaction with peers from around the world can 
certainly appear attractive. In fact, the results of the Picture of UN Staff survey 
conducted in 2005 (on what motivates or de-motivates UN staff, and what they think of 
the organization) indicate that idealistic reasons are primary for joining the UN and for 
staying with it (UNSpecial 2005). Idealistic reasons and interesting work represented 62 
percent of the answers to why they joined the UN in 2005, against 54 percent in 1995 
whereas reasons such as ‘to have a career’ or ‘by chance’ fall far behind. Table 10 
contains sample indicators from this survey that paints a telling picture. 
Table 10: UN staff’s motivations (1) 
1. Why did you join the United Nations? (tick max. 2 boxes)  
   2005 1995 2005–1995 
For idealistic reasons/belief in the United Nations  32.92  25.5  7.42 
To do interesting work  29.27  28.82  0.45 
To have a career  14.77  14.38  0.39 
By chance   10.14  12.75  -2.61 
For the salary  6.55  7.49  -0.94 
Lack of employment prospects elsewhere  2.27  3.14  -0.87 
To remain in the country of my duty station  2.08  3.20  -1.12 
Other (specify)  2  4.71  -2.71 
2. Why do you still work for the United Nations? (tick max. 2 boxes)  
   2005 1995 2005–1995 
Because the work is interesting  34.76  30.32  4.44 
For idealistic reasons  21.86  15.25  6.61 
To have a career  13.07  12.20  0.87 
For the salary  11.30  13.67  -2.37 
Retirement benefits  6.12  7.20  -1.08 
Because it is difficult to find work elsewhere  5.7  9.46  -3.76 
Other 2.58  3.36  -0.78 
To remain in the country of my duty station  2.56  4.76  -2.20 
Out of habit   2.05  3.78  -1.73 
Note:  This survey was the third to be launched with the help of UNSpecial, a magazine for Geneva-
based UN staff. The first survey was conducted for the 40th anniversary of the United Nations in 
1985 and limited to Geneva. The second, for the 50th anniversary in 1995, generated more than 
4,000 responses worldwide. The 2005 survey produced 5,320 responses, half from Geneva and 
New York, and half from other locations (UNSpecial 2005).   18
Table 11: UN staff’s motivations (2) 
What could or has motivate(d) you to go on mission in the field? (tick max. 2 boxes)  
   2005 1995  2005–1995 
Contributing to the UN ideals  32.60  30.99  1.61 
Career development  25.64  23.50  2.14 
Adventure 16.03  14.92  1.11 
Financial reward  8.78  8.17  0.61 
Other 5.21  7.49  -2.28 
Frustration at work  3.51  7.15  -3.64 
Personal reasons  4.49  4.90  -0.41 
Nothing 3.73  2.86  0.87 
 
If you have been on mission in the field, what was the impact on 
  2005 1995  2005–1995 
(a) Your career? 
Positive 64.20  51.60  12.60 
Negative 5.70  6.80  -1.10 
No impact   30.10  41.60  -11.50 
(b) Your personal development? 
Positive 86.50  90.40  -3.90 
Negative 2.43  2.00  0.43 
No impact   11.07  7.60  3.47 
(c) Your professional competence? 
Positive 83.28  83.20  0.08 
Negative 1.64  1.30  0.34 
No impact   15.08  15.50  -0.42 
Total 
Positive 78.01  75.00  3.01 
Negative 3.25  3.40  -0.15 
No impact  18.73  21.60  -2.87 
Source:   See Table 10. 
   19
Table 12: UN staff’s work environment 
Do you find that working in a multicultural environment is 
   2005 1995  2005–1995 
Enriching 72.81  61.90  10.91 
Stimulating 19.93  25.10  -5.17 
Difficult 4.01  7.40  -3.39 
Other 1.71  2.30  -0.59 
Frustrating 1.55  3.30  -1.75 
 
Results show that the motivations grounded in a commitment to ideals, and the 
interesting aspects of the work of the UN, are rather intertwined. In this context, the 
global scope of activities, which is one of the main characteristics of the United Nations, 
certainly plays an important role. Indeed, not only are UN professionals focusing on 
issues of global importance associated with international security and ethics, but they 
also have the possibility of being posted in a variety of places worldwide. While staff 
tend to primarily value a stable career at headquarters (in New York and Geneva in 
particular), the possibilities that the UN offers in terms of work in the field worldwide is 
another appreciated professional advantage.30 
Working in a multicultural environment is also a benefit to which the staff of 
international organizations are very sensitive (see Table 12). Parents in particular, tend 
to value the international cultural and educational environment to which it exposes their 
children. 
Career prospects and international organizations: a mixed picture – The question of 
career opportunities is a mixed blessing for the professional attractiveness of 
international organizations. On the one hand, in addition to high salaries, the ideals, the 
meaningful nature of the work and the multicultural environment, there are other factors 
which make a career in international organizations attractive. For those international 
organizations that are successful in maximizing human resources, these factors imply 
better career prospects for women and a vibrant career management and overall, more 
dynamic organizations and staff. On the other hand, there are less positive aspects of the 
professional culture of international organizations, which undermine their attractiveness. 
These aspects are by and large related to the minimization of (often already minimal) 
human resources, and the implications that this has on the working conditions of, and in, 
international organizations. 
 
                                                 
30    There is more to the story of peacekeeping operations. Although peacekeeping field posting are 
appreciated by some, especially by junior staff, for many who are posted in the field on a more 
permanent basis, it can be draining and unstable. In recent years, the UN DPKO has tried to improve 
the bridge between the professional tracks at headquarters with that in the field; field experience being 
more or less of a requirement for obtaining a post at headquarters.   20
Table 13: distribution of staff by gender at the IMF (for a more detailed table see Annex 6) 
  1980 1990 2004 
  No. % No. % No. % 
All staff  1 444  100.0  1 774  100.0  2 714  100.0 
Women  676 46.8 827 46.6  1  246  45.9 
Men  768 53.2 947 53.4  1  468  54.1 
Total Support Staff (A1-A8)  613 100.0 642 100.0 718 100.0 
Women  492 80.3 540 84.1 613 85.4 
Men  121 19.7 102 15.9 105 14.6 
Total Professional Staff (A9-A15)  646 100.0 897 100.0  1  633  100.0 
Women  173 26.8 274 30.5 579 35.5 
Men  473 73.2 623 69.5  1  054  64.5 
Total Managerial Staff (B1-B5)  185 100.0 235 100.0 363 100.0 
Women  11 5.9 13 5.5 54  14.9 
Men  174 94.1 222 94.5 309 85.1 
Source: IMF (2005: 88). 
 
Maximization of human resources, or the advantages of international organizations: 
Compared to national, regional or local administrations, the number of people working 
in international organizations is relatively small, especially in light of their global 
mandates.31 Hence the need to maximize the minimal resources. 
An important element of maximizing resources is the integration of the female 
workforce. The efforts that international organizations have made in recent years to 
achieve a more gender balanced workplace has increased their attractiveness. Generally, 
women are better represented in those international organizations (or departments) with 
a generalist mandate (the UN Secretariat for example) than in those with technical ones 
that do not deal directly with gender related issues.
32 Although there is still much 
progress to be made, especially in senior positions, gender balance is improving among 
                                                 
31   For instance, the United States Federal Government employs more than 89,000 civilians overseas 
alone, and the city of Vienna has 70,000 public employees (UN n.d.) 
32  Women account for 99 percent of UNIFEM’s workforce. Although less balanced in the higher grades, 
the situation is also rather balanced in UNICEF. As of February 2006, women represented 50 percent 
of international professional staff at the P-1 level, 67.59 percent at the P-2 level, 46.32 percent at the 
P-3 level, 41.19 percent at the P-4 level, 38.40 percent at the P-5 level, 34.34 percent at the D-1 level, 
20.59 percent at the D-2 level, 33.33 percent at the Assistant Secretary-General level. The Executive 
Director of UNICEF is a woman (figures provided by the Department of Human Resources of 
UNICEF).   21
professionals at the entry and mid-career levels.
33 While currently, at the UN, female 
representation in the higher grades of director (D-2) and principal officer (D-1) is 33.3 
percent and 33.2 percent respectively, in the professional category, female staff account 
for 41.3 percent. At entry levels, numbers are close to gender parity.34 At the World 
Bank, women account for 52 percent of all staff and 26 percent of management and 
senior technical positions (World Bank 2006). As for the IMF, Table 13 shows that, 
although a great deal remains to be done, gender balance among professional and 
managerial staff has evolved positively between 1980 and 2004. 
At a time when more and more women hold university degrees and skilled labor force is 
increasingly populated by women, gender efforts of international organizations are 
essential. In this regard, it is likely that international organizations offer better 
possibilities than the private sector.35 In some countries, this phenomenon becomes 
particularly significant. In Japan, for example, the percentage of women with higher 
education is almost equal to that of men and it is one of the highest of developed 
countries.36 Yet, women do not have equal career opportunities.37 As such, female 
students are encouraged to acquire skills that are marketable internationally (Ono 2004), 
to learn foreign language skills and earn foreign degrees (Ono and Piper 2001). This 
explains the fact that there are almost as many Japanese women as there are Japanese 
men in professional positions in international organizations,38 a ratio which certainly 
does not correspond to the domestic Japanese workforce. 
                                                 
33  Historically, and as in other work sectors, support staff in international organizations has largely been 
female, and this continues to be the case today. 
34  53.4 percent in the P-2 grade, and 44.9 percent in P-3 (P-1 being the lowest possible grade). See UN 
(2005a: 28). 
35  The difficulty of finding figures on the topic explains the tentativeness of our statement. Refer also to 
Kofman (2000). 
36  For example, women are awarded 66 percent of type-B first tertiary degrees in Japan. These degrees 
are defined as ‘focusing on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labor 
market […]. They have a minimum duration of two years full-time equivalent at the tertiary level.’ 
This ratio is among the highest in the world, outperformed only by some Eastern European countries. 
In addition, Japanese women are awarded 39 percent of Tertiary-Type A degrees, which are largely 
theory-based and are designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research 
programs and professions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry and architecture 
(OECD 2004: table A4.2). 
37   In 2003, the gender gap in the hiring of university graduates made a conspicuous drop to only 2 
percent, with 61.1 percent of male university graduates finding jobs and 59.1 percent of female 
graduates. However the positive picture is complicated by the fact that more female graduates take 
part-time job, and that many enterprises do not provide suitable or equal employment opportunities 
(‘Women’s Issues’, Japan Fact Sheet, http://web-japan.org/factsheet/woman/work.html). More 
generally, the fact that women are still not enjoying fair access to career opportunities is also a factor 
which pushes them to more aggressively than men pursue university studies. As a way to overcome 
practices of discrimination, this illustrates how when one is told that one is less worth than others, one 
tries to exceed others in exchange for recognition of one’s value. 
38    The substantial financial contribution of Japan to international organizations creates significant 
professional opportunities for Japanese nationals in these organizations. As of 1 January 2005 there 
were 318 Japanese women and 324 Japanese men working for international organizations (data 
provided by the Japanese mission to the UN, New York). And at the UN, there were 66 women 
occupying posts subject to geographical distribution compared to 55 Japanese men (UN 2005a: 48).   22
Dynamic career management is another factor, which can make international 
organizations attractive to skilled professionals. This requires a successful handling of 
human resources and reasonably good career prospects. In this perspective international 
organizations do not display equal human resources management in terms of hiring 
(with clear guidelines), career development (with institutionalized progress of career), 
and long-term stability. According to these benchmarks, the World Bank and the IMF 
seem to perform better than the United Nations. Without excluding room for further 
improvement, the IMF appears to be one of the more advantageous employers in this 
respect. Most initial appointments are offered for a term of two years and if 
performance shows potential, and if there is a continued need for the position, the staff 
may be offered a regular indefinite appointment. The average time that professionals 
spend in each grade respectively is one of the shortest among international 
organizations.39 In addition, the staff salary structure is regularly adjusted, i.e. 
increased.40 Moreover, the substantial financial resources available, makes the working 
conditions of the IMF attractive. 
Compared to the UN system, the IMF and the World Bank has a relatively small size 
workforce that deals with more targeted and technical issues calling for rather 
specialized and skilled professionals,41 also in demand in the private sector. In addition, 
the World Bank and the IMF are proportionally better funded and have a central and 
one-site location in Washington, DC.42 All this helps to explain why their human 
resource management performs better than that of the UN. This is not however to say 
that their output and track record, their ability to make a positive difference on the 
ground, exceeds that of the UN system.43 But it does make them attractive to skilled 
professionals. 
                                                                                                                                               
This is in contrast to other countries or regions where low financial contribution limits the possibilities 
of their well-educated workforce, especially women, to secure career opportunities in international 
organizations. This is often the case for countries in transition (Eastern European countries in 
particular) vis-à-vis the United Nations system. 
39  For instance in 2004, for A14 economists, this period of time was 3.2 years (3.3 years for men, and 
2.7 years for women), and for A15 economists, 2.9 years (3.1 years for men, and 2.0 years for women) 
(Lahti 2005: 70). 
40  For instance, after analyses of updated comparator salaries, the IMF salary structure was increased by 
5.6 percent for the fiscal year 2005, and the Board approved an increase of 3.6 percent for the fiscal 
year 2006 (IMF 2005: 86). 
41  At the IMF a Ph.D. is more often required than at the World Bank and the UN (where a Masters is 
usually the academic requirement) for a professional position. 
42   ‘The most important implication of UNEP’s location is the inability to attract and retain top-notch 
staff with the policy expertise and experience necessary to make the organization an anchor 
institution. Nairobi is not necessarily a desirable location for staff with the expertise management 
qualities, which UNEP needs. The increasingly treacherous security situation exacerbates the problem. 
In addition, the remoteness of UNEP has required frequent travel by the Executive Director and many 
senior staff imposing a heavy financial burden, but most importantly creating a leadership vacuum due 
to prolonged absences from Nairobi. The effective management of the organization requires that the 
leadership is present and responsive to staff needs and organizational priorities’ (Ivanova 2005). 
43    For the IMF, refer for instance to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 71-2). For the Bretton Woods 
institutions in general, see Stiglitz (2003).   23
Minimization of human resources; or the downsides of international organizations – 
Poor human resources management tends to be one of the disadvantages of international 
organizations. According to various studies and surveys, the UN is in many respects a 
rather unhappy place with dysfunctional characteristics, if not pathologies, which 
significantly impede its attractiveness to skilled professionals. Among the shortcomings 
related to the minimal use of already weak human resources, four important factors 
stand out: i) ambiguous security and career development tracks; ii) process rather than 
result-oriented work; iii) ad hoc and unsystematic implementation of mandates; and 
iv) self-centered exercise of leadership. 
Both in the public and private sectors, there is a general trend to hire staff on short-term 
contracts.44 In the UN in particular, this has become the rule rather than the exception. 
In 2005, the number of regular budget posts in the United Nations system was far lower 
than the extra-budgetary funds and short-term contracts for support and professional 
staff (see table in Annex 1). But before turning to the negative consequences of this 
trend, there are a few advantages that are worth mentioning. Short-term contracts 
provide flexibility and access to additional human resources that are all the more 
important in light of the reluctance of member states to increase the UN regular budget. 
In addition, short-term contracts are not necessarily followed by unemployment and 
they can go on for several years. Yet, the human and institutional costs of this trend 
make these positions less attractive, especially from the point of view of developed 
countries, in which the national civil service offers a long and well-delineated career. 
At a human level, short-term contracts bring a sense of insecurity and the constant 
possibility of the termination of the contract renders staff vulnerable vis-à-vis 
management. Also, short-term contracts encourage what one could call ‘institutional 
cowardness’, where staff is reluctant to challenge and report wrongdoings that they may 
witness in fear of jeopardizing their job. This has negative effects on the functioning of 
the UN. In the worst case scenario, the external as much as the internal status of short-
term staff without reasonable prospects of amelioration in the years ahead, results in 
them being treated as second-class citizens, which in turn leads them to be motivated 
primarily by ‘a-social self-interest’. Surviving in the current position or securing the 
next job is where most of the energy is spent. The quasi lack of institutionalized and 
predictable career development at the United Nations, the ambiguous long-term policy 
of the short-term contracts, encourages staff to have ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of the 
job. Moreover, the grade structure falls short of a formalized career track with clear 
guidelines of the requirements and selection process for the advancement in the 
profession, which well-functioning national administrations, or other international 
organizations, have. Rather, with the open-ended time spent in each grade,45 and with 
staff left under the impression that promotion depends more on connection than on 
competence (UNSpecial 2005), the lack of proper career development constitutes a 
major disincentive. 
                                                 
44    In a 2004 survey on human resources management practices commissioned by 30 international 
organizations (including the UN, World Bank and IMF), AHRMIO, reported a significant increase, 
from 6 percent in 1999, to 32 percent in 2003, in the number of international organizations which 
employ over 10 percent of their staff on a temporary basis (AHRMIO 2004). 
45 Short of progression mechanisms based on performance, time spent in each grade is likely to be 
lengthy. See Brewster and the ICC (2003).   24
Another unattractive aspect of the professional culture of the United Nations (although 
not specific to the UN) is its tendency to be more process, than result, oriented. 
Although certain UN bodies have more practical mandates that make them more action-
oriented, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), overall, the 
environment is prone to make process more than result a defining character of its 
professional culture. The same goes for other organizations with similar mandates that 
have reached a routine level, be it national administrations or even well established 
private companies. Four main factors shape the work ethics in this direction. First, there 
is the hierarchical structure of most UN institutions, in which decision-making is highly 
concentrated and, as actors are squeezed in between layers of authority, no real sense of 
initiative is encouraged. This is especially the case in the UN Secretariat. Second, there 
is a tendency of the United Nations to adopt conservative courses of action trying to 
avoid the responsibility and the risks associated with trying to make a difference. This 
trait is linked to the political and financial dependency of the UN vis-à-vis member 
states, and its remoteness from direct constituencies. Third, there is the servicing 
function that a number of UN departments and institutions have vis-à-vis member states 
in the establishment and follow-up of multilateral commissions, conferences and 
negotiations. Combined with the cumbersome and slow rhythms of the politics of UN 
diplomacy, this can turn activities into a ritualistic production of documents with little 
short-term result. This only worsens when the entity has weak political clout, such as 
the at times frustrating predicament of the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA). Fourth, the use of resources with unfocused and non-strategic spending 
of already limited resources renders progress, and progress assessment, difficult. As a 
result, an environment risks being created where activities are undertaken just for the 
sake of it. 
A third downside of the UN professional culture is its ad hoc and unsystematic 
character. This is rather ironic considering the importance that rules and regulations 
have in the United Nations context. Yet, it is as if there is a significant disconnect 
between them and their ability to put tracking systems in place in the various domains 
of action, internally as well as externally. Indeed, one of the areas in which the United 
Nations is significantly weak is in recording its activities and drawing as well as 
applying the lessons learnt. It is rare that systematic and well reasoned mechanisms 
record action.46 This makes the sharing of data and coordination of action among UN 
entities very problematic. In the United Nations Secretariat, the creation in the 1990s, 
along with a Policy and Strategic Planning unit in the Executive Office of the Secretary-
General, of a Lesson Learnt Unit (now the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section: PBPS), 
in the DPKO was designed to improve this shortcoming. Although some progress has 
been made, UN wide, much remains to be done. Most of the time there is only 
piecemeal information and coordination available. A tracking system would allow the 
UN not only to better grasp where it comes from and where it currently stands, but also 
provide instruments to identify and implement better policies. Instead, the lack of a 
systematic approach invites the United Nations to act in a state of semi-blindness, to 
extinguish fires with inadequate tools and only hope for the best; a position in which an 
                                                 
46   In addition to registering activities, systematic and well reasoned records also calls for putting the 
findings in perspective, historically and comparatively, within the UN context and vis-à-vis other 
relevant actors.   25
organization dedicated to solving global questions and crisis, and anticipating on future 
ones, does not wish to find itself. 
The unsystematic character of the UN way of doing business is one illustration among 
many of the under-institutionalization of the United Nations. As it weakens its capacity 
to be, and project itself as, professional, it also undermines its attractiveness for 
internationally skilled people. This is only reinforced by certain weaknesses at play in 
the selection process of senior management position where a lack of transparency and 
vague terms of references leave room for at times questionable reasons for appointment. 
This brings us to the fourth shortcoming, namely a self-centered exercised leadership. 
According to the United Nations Organizational Integrity Survey conducted in 2004 
(Deloitte Consulting LLP 2005), three sets of concerns stand out in terms of UN 
leadership. First, the discrepancies of United Nations leaders’ lofty rhetoric, not 
matching words with acts. Second, the tendency of the UN leadership to be uninterested 
in management. It is already problematic that frequently those in positions of leadership 
are not trained to exercise managerial responsibilities. Adding insult to injuries, there is 
a tendency to concentrate on the more ‘noble’ aspects of the job (such as political and 
diplomatic issues) on the expense of investing the required amount of time and work 
into management. Third, while the custodians of the welfare of the organization, UN 
leaders should place their own interest if not after, then at least not at odds with that of 
the organization, it is not uncommon that the contrary happens. The institutional 
pathologies of the United Nations can become a reason for its leaders not to try to 
improve it. Assessing that turning the place around would not only be a difficult 
exercise, but also very unlikely to be successful, management is inclined to opt for 
individualistic strategies, using the visibility and contacts associated with their position 
as a springboard. Weak institutional accountability within the UN allows them to get 
away with it.47 In the worst case, it amounts to the posturing of leadership. A posturing 
of leadership that is far from a healthy democratic leadership, that is more aware of its 
duties than of its rights and entitlements; a posturing of leadership that is far from using 
personal qualities not to personalize the institutions under its watch, but on the contrary 
to depersonalize them;48 a posturing of leadership that, far from thinking strategically 
for the organization and its mission, fails to realize that unless an institution is strong 
internally, it cannot be strong externally and everybody, including the people that it is 
supposed to serve, looses. While this leadership behavior is not specific to the United 
Nations, the public service and public good ideals and goals of the UN, are prone to 
make it all the more demoralizing for professionals taking the ethical dimension of the 
United Nations message seriously. 
                                                 
47    It also contributes to deprive the United Nations of the possibility to improve over time as an 
organization. To institutional growth is substituted a succession of ‘fits and starts’, a charade of 
permanent reform. 
48  Using personal leadership qualities to depersonalize institutions is meant to make the functioning of 
the institutions depend as little as possible upon individuals, allowing procedures and mechanisms to 
institutionalize in a dynamic way, motivating and committing its employees to the organization. 
Incidentally, using leadership to institutionalize the delegation of energy and power is one of the 
elements distinguishing democracy from authoritarian rule.   26
III – International civil service and distribution of power 
Despite the shortcomings, working for an international organization continues to be a 
popular professional choice. For instance, the average number of eligible people who 
apply for every vacant UN positions, support or professional, is 114 (UN 2004: 6) and 
for professional positions alone, the number of applicants per vacancy tends to be even 
higher, at times even twice as high.49 This being said, the extent to which international 
organizations appeal to professionals with skills marketable nationally and 
internationally is not only explainable by the intrinsic characteristics of their 
professional culture. It also has to be understood in connection with relations of power 
at the national and international level. More specifically, in connection with the place 
that international organizations and their potential staff occupy in the international and 
national distribution of power. In order to clarify this state of affairs, two aspects of the 
question will be touched upon. First, how the appeal of international organizations tends 
to be relative to the power position of the countries of origin of potential staff and, 
second, how the attractiveness of international organizations can be relative to the 
power position that staff occupy in their home countries.50 
The power status of international organizations vis-à-vis countries of origin 
For professionals from countries at the top of the hierarchy of international power, 
joining international organizations is not often a primary choice, whereas for 
professionals who belong to countries in the middle or low ranks of the international 
distribution of power, a career in international organizations is an attractive proposition. 
This suggests that the appeal of international organizations is relative to the power 
position of the countries of origin of the potential staff. 
From international power to international organizations as a second choice – The 
social prestige of an organization is largely based on its power, and on the extent to 
which it is, or derives from, a source of power. International organizations are not 
foreign to this status ‘law’. Their attractiveness as a working places is partly measured 
by their position in the distribution of power vis-à-vis member states. The examples of 
the United States and France illustrate this state of affair particularly well. 
Regarding the United States, its centrality in the international distribution of power 
shapes the professional trajectories, social attachments and status which seem highly 
desirable to skilled ambitious American professionals. With the United States being a 
global power, the role of an American skilled professional often also implies a 
significant influence on international affairs. Therefore, for these professionals, there is 
little that is more rewarding than an American career. This situation is especially 
striking in the context of the public sector. For instance, if the choice is between being a 
senior official in one of the United State’s Executive Branch entities dealing with 
international issues, or being a senior official in an international organization, the 
                                                 
49  In 2005, the average number of applicants for a P-5 position was 125, for a P-4 position it was 199, 
and for a P-3 position 335. Figures provided by the Department of Human resources of the UN. 
50  The tendencies examined correspond only to statistical trends. They simply provide an outline of the 
reality without pretending to give a comprehensive explanation of the personal trajectory of each 
international staff.   27
former is likely to be more attractive than the latter.51 The power of the United States 
reverberates on the Executive Branch, on its posts and its staff, granting them with 
social prestige as well as with strong personal satisfaction.52 Ultimately, the disparity of 
power between international and American organizations, accounts for patterns of 
professional mobility. For example, it is easier for a US national with a senior career in 
the American governmental machinery to be offered a senior position in an international 
organization, than for a US national with a senior career in international organizations to 
be proposed a senior position in the US government. 
The case of France is less straightforward, echoing its increasingly ambiguous status as 
an international power. The national professional realm tends to be preferred over the 
international, particularly for senior careers in the public sector. Traditionally there is 
more social prestige attached to a senior career in the national administration than to a 
senior career in an international organization, and being a high civil servant often serves 
as a stepping stone for a political career. In this regard, the Ecole nationale 
d’administration (ENA), that educates most high civil servants, cabinet members and 
key politicians, holds a prime of place in the national landscape.53 This situation is in 
line with the fact that France continues to see itself as a major power, and its public 
sector elite, nationally centered. Under these conditions, the declared commitment of 
France to international organizations, is not powerful enough to change the career of 
choice of its administrative and political elite. Joining international organizations on a 
seconded position does not help the career advancement of French high civil servants. 
In addition, the fact that career prospects in international organizations are less 
predictable than the ones in the national civil service also has a discouraging effect.54 
Hence, among French elite students and professionals, few see the attraction of joining 
international organizations. But at the same time France is growing defensive and 
insecure of its international standing, and the way in which its national administration 
and high civil servants function is increasingly seen more as part of the problem than of 
the solution. And the table of professional attractiveness turns. This is not to say that 
international organizations now constitute a more valued career path than the national 
high civil service but, compared to fifteen or twenty years ago, more well trained 
students and young professionals see beyond the national civil service. A career in 
international organizations is becoming an option that is not necessarily worse than the 
ones offered by the national administration. The current difficulty for university 
graduates and young professionals to find employment in France only adds to this 
evolution. 
                                                 
51  On the relationship between the state and civil society in the US and its impact on the respective social 
value assigned to private and public sector professions, such as lawyers and civil servants, see Cohen-
Tanugi (1985). 
52  ‘As we left, I reflected that it was hardly my skill that was moving the allies behind us. This was an 
exercise of American influence; the U.S. officials traveling with me called it the big dog barking as 
we flew from stop to stop – and it was a great feeling to be speaking for America. The exercise of 
American power would move others…’ (Lake 2000: 275). 
53  For a sociological analysis of the importance of ENA in France, see Bourdieu (1996). 
54  Although mobility traditionally has not been a factor of career advancement for French civil servants, 
this is changing. In 2004, decree number 2004-708 made mobility and secondment compulsory for 
civil servants recruited through ENA (article 1 and article 2 paragraph C). The decree is available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=LEX&nod=1DM004708#.   28
The pursuit of status through international organizations – The situation is quite 
different for skilled professionals from countries standing in the middle or at the low 
end of the international distribution of power. To them, working for international 
organizations is an attractive option. In addition to granting financial benefits that are 
substantially higher than their national salaries, the workforce of an international 
organization gives a professional and social status that the national job market of these 
countries has a difficulty matching. This has to do with the greater range of action and 
opportunities that can come with international organizations. Consider for instance 
diplomacy. Generally speaking, it is much more difficult for a diplomat of a developing 
country to have an impact internationally, than it is for a diplomat of a leading 
developed country. Short of the backing of a powerful state, a diplomat stands more or 
less on his or her own, at times being no more than a background actor. In a high-level 
position within an international organization, a developing country diplomat has more 
of a chance to overcome this predicament, especially if he or she joins an international 
organization with a political clout. Moreover, it is certainly more comfortable to be a 
staff member of an international organization that seeks to get countries out of trouble, 
than to be on the other side of the fence. Thus it is not uncommon that developing 
countries diplomats are attracted to senior UN positions while this is relatively rare for 
countries dominating the international hierarchy of power, except for the very top 
positions.55 
International organizations and the power position of its potential staff within 
their respective home countries 
The correlation between the attractiveness of international organizations to skilled 
professionals, and the distribution of power, extends to the position of the individual 
professionals in the distribution of power in their respective home countries. This 
correlation is rather straightforward. Skilled professionals with an ‘elite’ social and 
educational background from leading developed countries tend not to see international 
organizations as one of their first career choices, whereas skilled professionals from 
developing countries are prone to. 
Power distribution within leading countries and international organizations – It is not 
surprising that the disparity of power between international organizations and powerful 
countries, which brings about the dependency of the former vis-à-vis the latter, 
translates into certain patterns of behavior of skilled professionals in leading countries. 
These patterns amount to professionals from countries at the top of the international 
distribution of power being more attracted to careers inside than outside the national 
framework. This state of affairs is first and foremost the case in the United States. Data 
shows that in general, those highly skilled US nationals who are not entrepreneur 
minded and who are  trained in areas relative to international organizations, do not 
consider these organizations the most appealing professional option. Their educational 
background, often also a benefit of their privileged social background,56 puts them in a 
                                                 
55  The World Bank has always been headed by an American, and the IMF by a European. 
56    ‘Three-quarters of the students at the country’s top 146 colleges come from the richest socio-
economic fourth, compared with just 3 percent who come from the poorest fourth (the median family 
income at Harvard, for example, is USD 150,000). This means that, at an elite university, you are 25 
times as likely to run into a rich student as a poor one’, The Economist (2004).   29
position where they are able to get the best possible professional, financial and social 
rewards and recognition. The fact that the prestige of powerful professional US settings 
exceeds that of international organizations encourages American graduates on topics 
related to international organizations, to set their eyes on US government, universities, 
think tanks, Wall Street and other prestigious professional venues.57 However, later in 
their career, some chose to join international organizations for a period, preferably in a 
high position, as a finishing touch.58 Against this background, when it comes to the 
United Nations, those US nationals who consider international organizations as a long-
term career tend to come from the second tiers of US universities.59 
To a certain extent, this also applies to other developed countries. For instance few of 
the French professionals working for the United Nations come from elite schools, or 
have elite social backgrounds. Few graduated from elite schools, and the majority only 
holds Masters degrees. Moreover, those who are sons and daughters (actually more 
daughters than sons) of French diplomats tend to have a ‘moyenne bourgeoisie’ or 
‘petite bourgeoisie’ socio-economic background. And for those who come from a higher 
social background, chances are that working for the United Nations was not their first 
choice but, a career on which they settled ‘faute de mieux’. An analysis of nationals of 
the United Kingdom is likely to show similar results. Another interesting example is 
Japan. Again, few graduates from elite schools such as the University of Tokyo, and the 
Faculty of Law in particular, consider international organizations for a full time career. 
They prefer to be where power is, namely at home. Moreover, with the time-limited 
contracts becoming the norm, a career at the UN becomes all the less attractive for 
Japanese males, who are still the main bread-winners. This being said, for Japanese 
women with an elite socio-economic and educational background, international 
organizations remain a quite prestigious career.  
Power distribution within developing countries and international organizations – The 
picture tends to be reversed for developing countries.60 This can largely be explained by 
the access to education. In most developing countries access to education face even 
more severe inequalities. Although, in the past fifty years enrollment in primary 
education and the demand for access to secondary education has risen,61 this has not 
                                                 
57  For an American graduate, not all these options are of equal value. Elite graduates, especially those 
who have a background in law, prefer to make their first mark in the private sector (law firms and 
others), to then join the public sector in positions of responsibility, via political appointments.  
58    In certain American elite circles, especially on the East Coast, it may look good and quite 
‘progressive’, to have an international organization, including a UN, connection of some sort. For 
example, in a phone interview, Yves Dezalay stated that spending a few years with an international 
NGO can allow graduates from prestigious universities to acquire a ‘savoir-faire’ and contacts useful 
for a corporate career. For more, see for example Dezalay and Garth (2005). 
59  Incidentally, among American nationals working for the UN, the percentage of women tends to be 
higher than men (2005a: 50). 
60  A more detailed analysis would have to introduce some nuance to this statement, taking into account 
the various layers of elites in developing countries and their access to power (economic, social and 
political).  
61  The overall result has been that, by 1995, 70 percent of adults living in developing countries were 
literate, compared to less than half of the adult population in 1965. The number of adults in 
developing countries with at least some higher education has also increased from 28 million students 
in higher education in 1980, to 47 million in 1995 (World Bank 2000: 26-7).   30
removed the socio-economic inequalities in the access to education, particularly not for 
the absolute underdogs of society.62 This is especially the case since the growth of 
education in developing countries has been accompanied by an increase of private profit 
oriented education, with tuitions fees that are much higher than in public establishments, 
especially for higher education. In effect, this system excludes the under-privileged 
students from the competition and major imbalances remain in terms of access to 
education between urban and rural areas, and between rich and poor households.63 Only 
those who come from a privileged socio-economic background can afford international 
education and the limited scholarships offered by governments and foundations from 
developed countries, tend to benefit the students of higher socio-economic strata. The 
impact that this has on the marketability of professionals from developing countries at 
the international level is quite straightforward. Those socio-economic elites, who 
received the best education at home or abroad, are most likely to land a job 
internationally. In this regard, education in the United States, although more costly than 
in Europe, proves to be a good investment. The reputation of American universities over 
European universities serves as a useful ‘passport’, as a valuable asset that offers an 
edge of greater marketability, as well as social mobility at home and abroad. 
Against this background, to professional elites of developing countries with skills that 
overlap those in demand in international organizations, international organizations are 
quite attractive. Once someone from a developing country has been educated abroad, 
the pull for staying abroad is powerful. Even more so when language is not an obstacle 
and when a diaspora from the home country already exists in the host country.64 
International organizations benefit from this pull power. A student from a developing 
country, compared to a US graduate, who studied at Harvard University, is likely to see 
international organizations as an attractive career option. From a general point of view, 
there are most likely not only more, but also more stable, opportunities in the United 
States.65 More specifically, although the American job market is one of the most open 
ones, beyond those technical fields (engineering and science) in which foreign skilled 
professionals are in demand, it is still rather difficult for non-US nationals to enter. In 
contrast, and without even mentioning the challenge of obtaining a work permit, 
international organizations require good quality graduates from developing countries. 
Moreover, international organizations do not necessarily demand the level of English 
that American companies do.66 This helps explain why in international organizations, 
                                                 
62  See the example of India (Sen 2005: 211, 216-8). 
63    ‘We know of no country in which high-income groups are not heavily represented in tertiary 
enrollments. For example, in Latin America, even though the technical and professional strata account 
for no more than 15 percent of the general population, their children account for nearly half the total 
enrollment in higher education, and still more in some of the best public universities such as the 
University of São Paulo and the University of Campinas in Brazil, the Simón Bolivar University in 
Venezuela, and the National University of Bogotá in Colombia’ (World Bank 2000: 27-8). 
64  This is the case for the Indian subcontinent vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and North America, or for 
West and North Africa vis-à-vis France. 
65  Of course this all depends on the level and potential of development of the developing country, the 
extent to which it values graduates from good foreign universities, and how family connections can be 
used for success.  
66  The fact that French is widely spoken in Western and Northern Africa is an advantage for Western 
and Northern Africans who want to joint the UN system. Yet, with the decrease of the global 
importance of France, English increasingly becomes a must. Moreover, when a former colonial link   31
professionals from leading developed countries tend not to have a ‘first-class’ 
educational and socio-economic background whereas most professionals from 
developing countries tend to be from very good social and educational backgrounds. 
This is more or less the case across the board of professionals, and all the more for 
senior officials in international organizations (see, e.g. Weiss et al. 2005). A rather 
ironic picture unfolds as international organizations come to in a way endorse the social 
and economic (and ultimately political) disparities of developing countries that they are 
supposed to address. 
On the whole, the way in which attractiveness of international organizations reflects the 
inequalities of the social profile of skilled professionals in developed and developing 
countries, underlines an aspect of the geographical distribution principle. To a certain 
extent, one could argue that this principle, intended to be a democratic devise bringing 
national diversity to international organizations, also, by unveiling the inequalities of 
home countries, constitutes an expression of their democratic limits as well as that of 
international organizations. This is not surprising. But it is quite troubling considering 
international organizations’ commitment in principle, to social, economic and political 
justice. 
* 
Ultimately, the impact on home countries of how attractive international organizations 
are to professionals from developed and developing countries is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, professionals in international organizations accumulate a knowledge that can be 
useful for their countries of origin. On the other hand, it is in reality rare that these 
professionals return to apply their expertise at home, at least not until after a life-time 
career abroad. It is even worth considering how, as the mobility of talent increases, to 
what extent it is causing a brain drain, exhausting developing countries of their 
relatively small highly skilled workforce. Sure, in the field of finance, there are those 
professionals from developing countries who use a few years stay at the IMF as a way 
to gain professional credentials, to then leverage this experience for the purpose of a 
high level position back home.67 This may also be the case for professionals in senior 
positions or with specific expertise. However, for the average professional, who has 
spent his or her career in an international organization, there is no direct ‘return on 
investment’ for the country of origin. Furthermore, if professionals do return home, it is 
often for retirement. But this also happens less that one would think. While nostalgia for 
the home country persists, few professionals return after a life-time career abroad. This 
is particularly the case when they have acquired a private life with a family in a new 
country. By then, working for an international organization has become part of an exit 
strategy.68 
                                                                                                                                               
translates into English proficiency, it becomes an asset for working in international organizations. The 
large number of staff from India and to some degree Pakistan and of Philippines working in 
international organizations has to be seen in this context. 
67  For example, heads of central banks of developing countries often have an IMF experience, especially 
in Latin America. 
68   It is also interesting to note that the opening up of former communist countries to the West has 
changed the patterns of migration of professionals from these countries. While professionals from 
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Central Asia who join international organizations used to   32
IV – Lessons learned and pending questions, as a way of concluding 
In conclusion, let us briefly review some of the main lessons learnt and pending 
questions. 
Lessons learnt from the current state of professional attractiveness of international 
organizations  
Among the lessons that can be learnt from the paper, three stand out. They concern 
i)  the interaction between international organizations and home countries; ii) the 
evolving patterns of attractiveness based on the evolution of home countries; and iii) the 
place of women in the mobility patterns of skilled professionals. 
Interaction between international organizations and home countries – This paper has 
shown that the professional attractiveness of international organizations is related to the 
working conditions, the international standing of one’s country, and one’s place in the 
internal distribution of national power. As such, the analysis of the professional 
workforce of international organizations is a significant entry point to understanding 
national and transnational elites, to understanding their rationale and choice. 
Patterns of attractiveness of international organizations and evolution of home 
countries – In this regard, the more a country is economically advanced and powerful 
internationally, the less attractive a full fledged career in an international organization is 
likely to appear to its professional elite. Compared to developed countries and their 
professional benefits, the fact that international organizations do not stand at the 
traditional  center of power, and offer increasingly unstable career prospects, is a 
considerable disadvantage, especially for the UN. Although exceptions exist, this cannot 
persist as it only furthers the difficulty of attracting and keeping the ‘best and the 
brightest’. It  also risks becoming true for developing countries. As the powerful 
countries of the developing world are increasingly successful, chances are that their 
national professionals, could become less likely to overlook these shortcomings of 
international organizations. Since the UN system is particularly weak in this regard, the 
organization’s ability to rely on a high quality workforce in the future is questioned. 
International organizations and women in patterns of skilled professional mobility – 
Another lesson that emerges from this paper is the important role of women in the 
patterns of professional mobility towards international organizations. This is not only 
because international organizations are increasingly committed to gender parity. It is 
also in line with four other trends of our time. First, there is an increasing number of 
women with higher education, both in the developed and the developing world. Second, 
there is a female disentanglement from traditional sexual and family structures that 
gives women a certain autonomy that allows them to project themselves as individuals 
(Héritier 2002: 142-7). Third, there is a continued lack of equal access to professional 
careers in many countries, both developed and developing. Fourth, there is a female 
embrace of the international realm to overcome the barriers at home. In addition and 
                                                                                                                                               
do it with the support of their government, this is less and less the case. The fact that young people 
from former communist countries can travel, study abroad, and market themselves has drastically 
modified their professional mobility and the hiring process of international organizations (Hirschman 
2006).   33
more generally, there is perhaps a greater willingness of women to take risks and 
explore beyond the familiar (national).69 More specifically, there is also the fact that the 
current unraveling of the international civil service renders it less attractive to men (who 
to a large extent still are the bread-winners, in both developing and developed 
countries). For women, a career even in an international civil service that is under attack 
can be a supplemental income to the husband’s salary.70 Against this background, it is 
indeed striking to see that among candidates for jobs in international organizations, 
there are more and more women – women who act as free agents, more existentially and 
psychologically detached from their home governments than men.71 
Pending questions, and what to do about them 
The pending questions fall into three main categories: i) methodological, 
ii) institutional, and iii) normative/political.  
Methodological issues  and sociology of national/transnational elites – There is an 
urgent need for more research on the topics touched upon in the paper, especially now 
that the importance of globalization and of the institutions of global governance is 
becoming more and more cogent. At minimum, more research on the professionals of 
international organizations needs to be done. Having more comprehensive data on their 
socio-economic and educational background, as well as qualitative data on how they 
perceive their professional and life options, would improve the picture of the 
attractiveness of international organizations, and of the evolution of international 
bureaucracies.72 Beyond this, it would be useful to have more systematic information 
on national elites and its patterns of transnational mobility (transversal and social 
upward mobility). This would open the possibility for ‘a sociology of elites’ at the 
international level, which is by and large missing (see Dezalay 2004: 151-2). Such a 
sociology would have to systematically examine the correlation between the place of the 
professional elite in the internal distribution of countries, and the place of these 
countries within the international distribution of power. It would also have to analyze 
the informal international/national elite networks in which international organizations 
often gravitate, and which are so important in their functioning. This would have to be 
done professional field by professional field, taking gender issues into account.73 In 
time, this would give a better understanding of the dual process of socialization of the 
                                                 
69   Social anthropology tells us that it is a traditional pattern for women to leave their family and the 
world in which they grew up, e.g. Héritier (1996; 2002: 133-5). 
70    This could be somewhat reminiscent of the fact that in France, the gradual femininization of 
educational professions (primary, secondary, and then university) cannot only be explained by 
democratization. It is also related to the decline of the teaching profession, in terms of comparative 
status and salary making it less and less viable to economically sustain a middle-class family. 
71  Women working abroad as skilled professionals are less likely than men to be part of home country 
networks. 
72    A book doing for international bureaucracies what Silberman (1993) has done on administrative 
history and organization theory in a national context would be extremely illuminating. 
73  On the need to go beyond traditional models of migration and to integrate the women factor, see for 
example Kofman (1999).   34
international realm on one hand, and of internationalization of national societies on the 
other.74 
Institutional questions for international organizations – As we have seen, weak 
management of human resources has a strong impact on the professional attractiveness 
of international organizations. On this account, the United Nations system has to 
achieve much progress. How can it happen and will it happen? These are open questions 
and if the past is an indication of the future, there are reasons for pessimism. After all, 
that UN reform constitutes a recurrent issue is an indication of past efforts of reform 
with little progress. Yet, improving the United Nations is not out of reach. It is 
necessary to find a middle course between too much security as understood in 
traditional bureaucracies, and too much insecurity as a result of the lack of funding 
combined with an ideological understanding of liberal management of human 
resources.75 This entails relating to professionals as an asset and not a liability. 
On a quest for a progressive agenda – International organizations cannot be expected to 
be more democratic than their member states, neither at the policy, nor at the 
functioning level. There is a domino effect at play between the shortcomings of member 
states and those of international organizations. But this is to not say that international 
organizations are not to be held accountable for their limitations because, to a large 
extent, international organizations are allowing these shortcomings to persist. Their 
well-functioning is essential to the expression and service of their progressive message 
of political, economic and social inclusion. Being dysfunctional as well as subservient 
towards the powerful and contemptuous vis-à-vis the powerless, is not an option for 
international organizations, at least not if their message is going to be taken seriously. 
Making sure that international organizations are centers of professional and ethical 
excellence is the best way to nourish their legitimacy and bring the intended global 
corrective socio-economic and security effects. Under this condition international 
organizations are more likely to become instruments of progress rather than ‘caisses de 
résonance’ of inequalities and tools of regression. Under this condition, their 
professionals are more likely to find a place away from home and be part of ‘an 
aristocracy of responsibility, moved by a moral responsibility to think a world better, 




                                                 
74  ‘Properly construed, The State Nobility offers a systematic research program on any national field of 
power, provided that the American (British, Japanese, Brazilian, etc.) reader carries out the work of 
transposition necessary to generate, by way of homological reasoning, an organized set of hypotheses 
for comparative inquiry in her own country’ (Wacquant 1996: xiii). In addition, in light of the double 
phenomena of socialization of the international realm and of the internationalization of national 
societies, it is also a sociology of the international placement of national elite which is required. On 
this issue, though somewhat different from the one held in this paper, see Huntington (2004). 
75  ‘Ideological understanding’ of the liberal model of management of human resources, because in the 
private sector, even in industries which are cutting edge and throat cutting, seniority for highly skilled 
professionals, partly based on competition and competence, is more rewarded than one would think at 
first sight.   35
Annex 1 
Staff of the United Nations Secretariat and other entities, as at 30 June 2005 



















categories Subtotal  Total 
UN Secretariat  3 133  4  4 616  7 753  2 621
a  1 005  4 610  8 236
b 15  989 
UNDP
c       1  581
d  789  3 172  5 542
e 5  542 
UNFPA       193  218
f 931
g  1 342  1 342 
UNHCR 89    130  219  1  877
h    4 543  6 420  6 639 
UNICEF       2  657
i 1  410
j  4 914  8 981  8 981 
UNITAR       6  23  6  35  35 
UNOPS       665    313  978  978 
UNRWA
k 91  0    11  102  36  0  0  36  138 
ITC
l       75  43  95  213  213 
ICSC       18    18  36  36 
UNJSPF       49    106  155  155 
ICJ  33  51  84  12   2  14  98 
UNU       23  38  60  121  121 
Total  3 346  4  4 808  8 158  9 620  3 526  18 770  31 916  40 074 
Notes:    These figures refer to staff in appointments of one year or more. The abbreviations stand for the 
following: UNDP – United Nations Development Program, UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund, 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF – United Nations International 
Children’s Funds, UNITAR – UN Institute for Training and Research, UNOPS – United Nations Office for 
Project Services, UNRWA – United Nations Relief Agency and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, 
ITC – International Trade Center, ICSC – International Civil Service Commission, UNJSPF – United 
Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, ICJ – International Court of Justice, UNU – United Nations University. 
a  Including 606 Professional, 720 Field Service and 131 General Service staff in peacekeeping operations 
with limited appointments of one year or more. 
b  Including 10 Professional and 79 General Service staff against revenue-producing accounts. 
c  Including staff charged to the UNDP core budget, funds managed by UNDP and UNDP supplementary 
funds. 
d  Including National Officers. 
e  Excluding 1,169 under UNDP 300-series contracts for appointments of limited duration. 
f  Including Headquarters General Service, country office General Service and National Officers. 
g  Including Junior Professional Officers. 
h  Including 294 National Professional Officers and 86 Junior Professional Officers. 
i Including  Professional  staff and National Officers occupying posts funded by regular budget resources. 
j  Including Professional staff and National Officers occupying posts funded from project funds. 
k  Excluding area staff. 
l  A number of posts in ITC are financed jointly by the UN from the regular budget and by the World Trade 
Organization. 
Source:  UN (2005a: 9).   36
Annex 2 
Staff size and the number of member states, 27 international organizations 
Staff  Number of member states 
first year  1985  last year 










Organization Period  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ADB 1981-2000  1,257  1,553  2,058  2.6  44  59  1.6  1.6 
BIS 1950-2000  142  314  500  2.5  28  49  1.1  2.3 
CARICOM 1973-2000  74  182 221 4.1 4  15  0.5  0.8 
CoE 1980-2000  764  830  1,216  2.4  21  44  3.8  0.6 
EC/EU 1968-2000  9,026  19,781  30,777  3.9  6  15  2.9  1.3 
ESA 1974-2000  1,462  1,376  1,718  0.6  11  14  0.9  0.7 
FAO 1963-1999  4,096  6,951  4,072  0  106  175  1.4  0 
GATT/WTO 1953-2001  35  300  368  5  32  142  3.2  1.6 
IAEA 1964-2000  661  1,964  2,136  3.3  82  130  1.3  2.5 
IBRD 1953-1998  433  5,700  6,800  6.3  53  182  2.8  2.3 
ICAO 1963-2000  503  875  759  1.1  101  187  1.7  0.6 
IFAD 1978-2000  80  174  265  5.6  55  126  3.8  1.5 
IFC 1964-2001  118  433  1,063  6.1  78  175  6.2  1.0 
ILO 1963-1999  1,445  2,838  2,393  1.4  108  174  1.3  1.1 
IMCO/IMO 1963-2000  43  251 274 5.1  54  157  2.9  1.8 
IMF 1950-2001  444  1,646  2,976  3.8  47  184  2.7  1.5 
ITU 1964-1999  372  742  770  2.1  116  188  1.4  1.5 
OECD 1961-2001  1,008  (1,827
a) 2,291  2.1  20  30  1.0  2.1 
UNESCO 1963-1999  2,379  3,171  2,348  0  109  188  1.5  0 
UNHCR 1986-2000  2,138  n.a.  5,423  6.9  41  60  2.8  2.5 
UPU 1963-2000  57  141  151  2.7  121  189  1.2  2.3 
WHO 1963-1999  2,655  4,477  4,000  1.1  117  193  1.4  0.8 
WIPO 1974-2001  157  288  817  6.3  36  177  6.1  3.3 
WMO 1963-1999  114  295  264  2.4  125  185  1.1  2.2 
                     
unweighted arithmetic average:       3.2      2.5  1.28 
          (3)/(1)        (6)/(5)   
Sum:    29,463  n.a.  73,660  2.5  1.515  3.038  2.01  1.24 
out of sample:
b                            
Commonwealth 1992-2000  431  n.a.  305  -4.2  54  54  0  - 
EFTA 1964-2000  144  71  71  -1.9  7  4  -1.5  1.3 
NATO 1959-2001  603  1,134  1,083  1.4  15  19  2.4  0.6 
Notes: 
a 1988. 
b not used in regression analysis. 





UN Secretariat Staff in posts subject to geographical distribution by nationality, grade and gender 
  Number of staff           
30/06/2004  USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P4 P-3 P-2 P-1
Number of staff 
30/06/2005  Country of nationality 
Total F  M  F  M  FM F  M F M  F  M  F M F  M F  M F F  Total 
Midpoint Desirable 
range 
Afghanistan  2             1    1            2  6.54 2-14 
Albania  4 3            1       3    3 4  6.01 1-14 
Algeria  6 2         1 1    1    1 1      2 5  7.75 3-14 
Andorra  1 1                1        1  5.94 1-14 
Angola  1                           6 . 2 3 1 - 1 4  
Antigua and Barbuda  1 1             1        1 1  5.91 1-14 
Argentina  29 17 1      1     3 3    2 5 1 3 5 7     18 31  21.43 17-26 
Armenia  5         1          3    1        5  5.96 1-14 
Australia  40 18        1 1 1 9 5 4    2 4 8  12    23 47  30.82 26-36 
Austria  24 12           1 1 2 3 4 5 6 4     13 26  19.27 14-24 
Azerbaijan  4 3             1 2     2    3 5  6.12 1-14 
Bahamas  9 7             1 1 5 1 1    7 9  6.07 1-14 
Bahrain                             6.34 2-14 
Bangladesh  10    1        1    5    3            10  9.10 4-14 
Barbados  2 2           2          2 2  6.02 1-14 
Belarus  11           3      4    3          10  6.35 2-14 
Belgium  30 13       2    3 3 4 2 3 5 6 5 1      15 34  22.55 18-27 
Belize  3 1            1     1 1     1 3  5.89 1-14 
Benin  4             2    1    1    1        5  6.08 1-14 
Bhutan  4           1    1    2    1          5  5.93 1-14 
Bolivia  7 3           1     4 1    1    3 7  6.20 1-14 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  6 2          1      2    1 2    2 6  5.99 1-14 
Botswana  1                    1    1 1  6.09 1-14 
Brazil  36 10       1    2 1 7 2 7 4 4 4 1 3     14 36  33.37 28-38 
Brunei  Darussalam                             6.40 2-14 
Bulgaria  15 5         1    2 2 5 2    2      6 14  6.29 1-14 
Burkina Faso  4 3        1 1      1    1      3 4  6.18 1-14 
Burundi  6 1          1    1 1 4       1 7  6.04 1-14 
Cambodia  3 1            1 1        1 2  6.20 1-14 
Cameroon  15 6         1    3 1 4 1 1 3      5 14  6.34 2-14 
Canada  51 22    2       2  2 11 4 13  13 3  3    1     25 54  49.88 42-57 
Cape Verde  4             1    2    1          4  5.89 1-14 
Central African Republic  4             1    1      1        3  5.97 1-14 
Chad  2             1    1            2  6.09 1-14 
Chile  25 10     1      2 2     2    4 3 7 2    7 23  9.65 5-14 
China  57 33 1      1 1 2 2 8 2 5 5 3  12  5  12    34 59  66.06 56-76 
Colombia  11 3 1         1 2    2 2 1 1      4 10  9.24 4-14 
C o m o r o s                              5 . 9 0 1 - 1 4  
Congo  3               2    1          3  5.97 1-14 
Costa Rica  4 2        1 1      1 1       2 4  6.42 2-14 
Cote d'Ivoire  10           1    2    3    4          10  6.41 2-14 
Croatia  7 4           1    2 2 1 1     4 7  6.53 2-14 
Cuba  6 2           1 1    2 1 1     2 6  6.77 2-14 
Cyprus  3             1      1    1        3  6.48 2-14 
Czech Republic  6 2      1      1 2 2       1    3 7  8.90 4-14 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea  1                 1          1  6.51 2-14 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  6 3            1 1    1 3     2 6  7.16 2-14 
Denmark  16 7       1      1 2 3 1 2 4      7 14  17.04 12-22 
Djibouti  6 1          2      2 1 1     1 6  5.90 1-14  
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Annex 3 continued  Number of staff           
30/06/2004  USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P4 P-3 P-2 P-1
Number of staff 
30/06/2005  Country of nationality 




Dominica  3                 3          3  5.88 1-14 
Dominican Republic  6 1          1   3      1   1  5  6.60 2-14 
Ecuador 6  2          1    1   3  1     2  6  6.44 2-14 
Egypt  14  5    1    1   1  1 6   2 1 1 1   1      5  16  9.32 5-14 
El Salvador 8  4           1    1  3  2     3  7  6.35 2-14 
Equatorial Guinea  2               2            2   5 . 9 1 1 - 1 4  
Eritrea 6  2           1   1   2  2     2  6  5.97 1-14 
Estonia  4 2              1  2  1    2  4  6.08 1-14 
Ethiopia  19  6         1   1  1    4 3 1 2 6        6  19  7.61 3-14 
Fiji  9 7              2  1  1  5   6  9  5.94 1-14 
Finland 17  6         1   1   2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1      5  15  14.19 9-19 
France 105  50  1       2    6  9 15 7 16  13 9 12  12  14      55  116  100.04 85-115 
Gabon 2                 2         2  6.03 1-14 
Gambia  4 1      1     1    1       1  3  5.91 1-14 
Georgia  3             1   1           2  6.01 1-14 
Germany  137  51  1      1  2  2 13    20 11 19 16 15 17 16 10      57  143  141.05 120-162 
Ghana  13  5  1       2   2  3  3  2       5 13  6.41 2-14 
Greece  9 4         1 4  1   1  1  1  2    4 11  14.27 9-19 
Grenada  2                 2         2  5.88 1-14 
Guatemala  3 2           1    1  1     2  3  6.60 2-14 
Guinea  2               1   1   1       3  6.11 1-14 
Guinea-Bissau                             5 . 9 1 1 - 1 4  
Guyana  13  11       1 2     1  3   4   2   10 13  5.90 1-14 
Haiti  3 2            1  2       2  3  6.10 1-14 
Honduras  2               1   1         2  6.10 1-14 
Hungary  9 2         1 2   4  1  1      2  9  8.02 3-14 
Iceland 5  1          1   2   1   1  1   1  6  6.39 2-14 
India  47 18 1          2 4  2 6   6 8 8 3 3 4      19  47  36.31 31-42 
Indonesia 13  6                   1 1 1 3 3 4 3      8  16  12.89 8-18 
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  9 6        1  2 2  2     1     5  8  9.79 5-15 
Iraq  6 3        2  1 1   1  1   1     3  7  6.74 2-14 
Ireland  15  5       1     1   4 1 2 3   1 3        6  16  11.34 7-16 
Israel  8 4         1 1  2    2   3  1   4 10  13.20 8-18 
Italy  102  52  1    1    2  1 1    6  4  15 10 18 27 11  8      50  105  82.35 70-95 
Jamaica 13  8       1         1 1 1 5 2 2 2        9  15  6.04 1-14 
Japan 110  64  1        1  1 2  1 6  8  17 24 16 21  2  11      66  111  308.45 262-355 
Jordan  8 2          1  1  4   2  1     2  9  6.16 1-14 
Kazakhstan 7  3              2  1  2  2   3  7  6.57 2-14 
Kenya  24  14        1  1 4  4  2  2  2  8      15 24  6.75 2-14 
Kiribati                             5 . 8 8 1 - 1 4  
Kuwait 1  1        1             1  1  8.42 4-14 
Kyrgyzstan  5 2           1    1   2  1   2  5  5.99 1-14 
Lao People's Democratic Republic  1               1           1  6.01 1-14 
Latvia  3 1              2  1  1    1  4  6.14 1-14 
Lebanon  15  5         1       2   1 2 4 2 1        4  13  6.31 2-14 
Lesotho  3 3             2   1     3  3  5.92 1-14 
Liberia  6 5         1 1  2   1   1     5  6  5.95 1-14 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  2           1     1           2  8.02 3-14 
Liechtenstein                             5 . 9 4 1 - 1 4  
Lithuania  4 2             1  2  1     2  4  6.31 2-14 




Madagascar  3 1          1   1   1  1     1  4  6.31 2-14 
Malawi  4             1   1   1         3  6.16 1-14 
Malaysia  8 4    1     1   1  3    2    1   4  9  9.54 5-14 
Maldives  1                 1         1  5.89 1-14 
Mali  8 2       1   2   1   2    1      1  7  6.19 1-14 
Malta  1         1            1   1  2  6.09 1-14 
M a r s h a l l   I s l a n d s                              5 . 8 8 1 - 1 4  
Mauritania  3               2   1         3  5.95 1-14 
M a u r i t i u s   2                            6 . 0 6 1 - 1 4  
Mexico  16  9         1  3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1      10  19  37.19 32-43 
Micronesia  (Federated  States  of)  1                 1         1  5.88 1-14 
M o n a c o                              5 . 9 1 1 - 1 4  
Mongolia  5 2            1  2  2      2  5  5.94 1-14 
Morocco  7 4         1  2  1   1   1     4  6  7.27 2-14 
Mozambique  3           1   1       1       3  6.31 2-14 
Myanmar  4               2     2  1   1  5  7.12 2-14 
Namibia  3 1    1          1  1      1  3  6.00 1-14 
N a u r u                              5 . 8 8 1 - 1 4  
Nepal  9             1   7   1         9  6.51 2-14 
Netherlands  30 6         1   3   7 2  11  4 1 2       _  8  31  32.24 27-37 
New  Zealand  10  5    1    2 1   1  2  1  2  3  2     8 15  9.35 5-14 
Nicaragua  6 4            1  2  1  2     4  6  6.00 1-14 
Niger  3 2       1       1    1    2  3  6.18 1-14 
Nigeria  17  3        3   3   3  1  2  1  1    2 14  9.37 5-14 
Norway  8 3  1         2  1   1  1  1   2   5  9  16.42 12-21 
Oman  3 1      1    1        1    1  3  7.00 2-14 
Pakistan  17  5        1 2   2   1 1 3 3 2 1   1      7  17  10.14 5-15 
P a l a u                              5 . 8 8 1 - 1 4  
Panama  2 1      1        1       1  2  6.23 1-14 
Papua  New  Guinea  3               1   1   1       3  6.04 1-14 
Paraguay  3 2             1  1    2   3  4  6.18 1-14 
Peru  12  3      1   2  1  1   3  2  2      3 12  7.89 3-14 
Philippines  51  35          1  9  6  10  9  11    3    33 49  9.13 4-14 
Poland  11  2        2   1  2  3   2   1    2 11  13.80 9-19 
Portugal  8 4          1   1   2  2   3   5  9  13.33 9-18 
Qatar  1                 1         1  6.87 2-14 
Republic  of  Korea  27  9 1           1   2 1 7 5 7 4 2 1      11  31  34.56 29-40 
Republic  of  Moldova  1           1               1  5.97 1-14 
Romania  11  3        1     2   5  3   1   4 12  7.26 2-14 
Russian  Federation  106  14  1     3   13  1  18  3  36  5  18  5  1     14  104 25.91 21-31 
Rwanda  5               1   2   2       5  6.08 1-14 
Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis  5 3           1  1  1   2  1    4  6  5.88 1-14 
Saint  Lucia  2 1            1    1     1  2  5.90 1-14 
Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines  3 1             1  2      1  3  5.88 1-14 
S a m o a                              5 . 8 8 1 - 1 4  
San  Marino  2 2                 2   2  2  5.91 1-14 
S a o   T o m e   a n d   P r i n c i p e                              5 . 8 8 1 - 1 4  
Saudi  Arabia  7 6         1     3  1    1   5  6  17.38 13-22 
Senegal  15  3      2   2   2  1  1   2  3     4 13  6.19 1-14 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  7 1          2   3   2  1     1  8  6.38 2-14 
Seychelles  3 1        1      1     1      1 3  5.90 1-14 
Sierra Leone  4 3       1      2     1       3 4  6.00 1-14 
Singapore  10 5     1    1    1 2 1     2 1 1      5 10  11.93 7-17 
Slovakia  5 1   1           4    1       1 6  6.77 2-14 
Slovenia  5 3    1    1           3      3 5  7.17 2-14 
Solomon Islands  1                 1          1  5.89 1-14 
Somalia  4 1          1 1 1         1 3  6.06 1-14 
South Africa  12 3           4 1 3 1 4 1      3 14  11.39 7-16 
Spain  49 24         1    3  2 10 6 14  12 2  5     25 55  45.61 39-52 




Annex 3 continued  Number of staff           
30/06/2004  USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P4 P-3 P-2 P-1
Number of staff  
30/06/2005  Country of nationality 




Sudan  6 1        1    1    4 1    1        2 8  6.77 2-14 
Suriname  3 1            1 1     1       1 3  5.89 1-14 
Swaziland  4 2            1     2        2 3  5.92, 1-14 
Sweden  30 19     1 1    1 1    6 3 2 1 1 5    9     20 31  21.43 17-26 
Switzerland  11 5 1       2 1 1    3 1    3 3 3     8 18  24.46 20-29 
Syrian Arab Republic  9  5         2    1    2 2    4        6 11  6.86 2-14 
Tajikistan  1                   1         1  6.02 1-14 
Thailand  17 9         1 1 1 1 3 4 1 2 1       8 15  10.48 6-15 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  4 1              3 1        1 4  6.00 1-14 
Timor-Leste                              5.90 1-14 
Togo  7             1    1      3         5  6.01 1-14 
Tonga  1 1                 1     1 1  5.88 1-14 
Trinidad and Tobago  12 9        1    1      1 1 6 2       9 12  6.23 1-14 
Tunisia  10 2     1      1 1 1    2 1 1         2 8  6.58 2-14 
Turkey  11 5         2 2 1     1 2 2 2       5 12  13.18 8-18 
Turkmenistan                              6.05 1-14 
Tuvalu  1               1             1  5.88 1-14 
Uganda  22 8      1 1    2    4 1 2 3 3 3 1       8 21  6.58 2-14 
Ukraine  19 2         2    5    7    3 2        2 19  7.47 3-14 
United  Arab  Emirates                              9.58 5-14 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  104 45  2    2    3  1  8  2 21  13  15  12 9 12 2  6     46 108 101.52 86-117 
United Republic of Tanzania  10 6    1         1 1 1 2 2 1        5 9  6.79 2-14 
United States of America  313 171  1    1  1  3  2  14 24 37 37 45 52 28 31 13 23     170 312  351.14 298-404 
Uruguay  8 4       1     2    1 1    1    1     4 7  6.68 2-14 
Uzbekistan  1                   2 2     2 4  6.66 2-14 
Vanuatu  1           1                 1  5.88 1-14 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  10 4       1     1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 1     5 13  9.08 4-14 
Viet Nam  3 1          1    1 1          1 3  8.02 3-14 
Yemen  2             1 1            1 2  6.41 2-14 
Zambia  7 1        1    1    1    1 1 1       1 6  6.15 1-14 
Zimbabwe  13 5           3 2 1 1 4 2        5 13  6 25 1-14 
Subtotal  2 513  1 063  17  5  12  7  44  23  139  82  314  174  423  300  346  331  174  188     1 110  2 579    
                               
O t h e r s                                
P a l e s t i n e                                
Stateless  2           1        1             2   
Subtotal  2           1        1             2   
                             
Total  2 515  1 063  17 5 12 7 45 23 139 82 314 174  424  300 346 331 174 188 1 110 2 581
Source:  UN (2005a: 47-53) 
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Annex 4 
Geographic distribution of staff at the IMF by developing and industrial countries 
 1990    2004
 1 
Staff No.  %    No.  % 
                
All staff  1,774 100.0   2,714  100.0
Developing countries  731 41.2   1,187  43.7
Industrial countries  1,043 58.8   1,527  56.3
          
                
Total support staff 
2 642 100.0   718  100.0
Developing countries  328 51.1   394  54.9
Industrial countries  314 48.9   324  45.1
          
                
Total professional staff 
3 897 100.0   1,633  100.0
Developing countries  343 38.2   682  41.8
Industrial countries  554 61.8   951  58.2
          
     Total economists  529  100.0    1,008  100.0
     Developing countries  220 41.6   442  43.8
     Industrial countries  309 58.4   566  56.2
          
     Total specialized career streams  368  100.0    625  100.0
     Developing countries  123 33.4   240  38.4
     Industrial countries  245 66.6   385  61.6
          
                
Total managerial staff 
4 235 100.0   363  100.0
Developing countries  60 25.5   111  30.6
Industrial countries  175 74.5   252  69.4
                
     Total economists  184  100.0    293  100.0
     Developing countries  54 29.3   91  31.1
     Industrial countries  130 70.7   202  68.9
          
                
     Total specialized career streams  51  100    70  100.0
     Developing countries  6 11.8   20  28.6
     Industrial countries  45 88.2   50  71.4
          
Notes: 
1 Includes only staff on duty: differs from the number of approved positions; 
2 Staff in Grades 
A1-A8; 
3 Staff in Grades A9-A15; 
4 Staff in Grades B1-B5. 





Annex 5 Salary scale at the United Nations, World Bank, and IMF 
Salary scale at the United Nations for the professional and higher categories showing annual gross salaries and net equivalents after application of staff 
assessment (USD, effective 1 January 2005) 
S T E P S   
Level  I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV 
Gross  189952                
Net  D  127970                
 
USG 
Net  S  115166                
Gross  172860                
Net  D  117373                
 
ASG 
Net  S  106285                
Gross  141974  145065  148156  151248  154340  157431           
Net  D  98224  100140  102057  103974  105891  107807           
 
D-2 
Net  S  90236  91854  93466  95072  96674  98269           
Gross 129405 132119 134832 137547 140261 142974 145689 148403 151116             
Net  D  90431 92114 93796 95479 97162 98844  100527  102210  103892             
 
D-1 
Net  S  83587 85050 86509 87965 89418 90867 92312 93755 95194             
Gross 106368 108679 110987 113295 115605 117913 120223 122532 124842 127150 129458 131768 134077     
Net  D  76148 77581 79012 80443 81875 83306 84738 86170 87602 89033 90464 91896 93328     
 
P-5 
Net  S  70742 72014 73282 74550 75815 77077 78338 79596 80852 82106 83358 84607 85855     
Gross  86211  88303  90423  92650  94679  97106  99335  101563 103792 106018 108247 110474 112703 114931 117160 
Net  D  63499 64880 66262 67643 69025 70406 71788 73169 74551 75931 77313 78694 80076 81457 82839 
 
P-4 
Net  S  59132 60390 61647 62901 64155 65407 66659 67909 69157 70405 71651 72896 74140 75383 76625 
Gross  69779 71715 73656 75589 77530 79467 81402 83342 85280 87217 89156 91161 93226 95287 97350 
Net  D  52654 53932 55213 56489 57770 59048 60325 61606 62885 64163 65443 66720 68000 69278 70557 
 
P-3 
Net  S  49149 50325 51503 52678 53856 55030 56206 57383 58558 59734 60906 62079 63250 64422 65594 
Gross  56465 58056 59643 61344 63077 64809 66542 68273 70008 71742 73473 75209       
Net  D  43655 44800 45943 47087 48231 49374 50518 51660 52805 53950 55092 56238       
 
P-2 
Net  S  40947 41985 43020 44057 45092 46130 47184 48234 49289 50341 51392 52447       
Gross  43831 45358 46883 48413 49938 51464 52992 54519 56043 57571           
Net  D  34558 35658 36756 37857 38955 40054 41154 42254 43351 44451           
 
P-1 
Net  S  32599 33612 34625 35638 36650 37662 38676 39676 40672 41668           
D = Rate applicable to staff members with a dependent spouse or child. S = Rate applicable to staff members with no dependent spouse or child. Staff assessment to be used in conjunction with gross base salaries 
A. Staff assessment rates for those with dependants: 
Assessable income (USD)  Spouse or a dependent child (%) 
First 30000  18 
Next 30000  28 
NEXT 30000  34 
Remaining assable payments  38 
B. Staff assessment of those without dependants: equal to the differences between the gross salaries at different grades and steps and the corresponding net salaries at the single 
rate.  Source: The International Civil Service Commission’s website: http://icsc.un.org/sal_ss.asp  43
Salary scale of the World Bank (USD, effective 1 July 2004) 
Executive Management Remuneration 
Reflecting the responsibilities of the various management positions, the salary of the President, effective 
1 July 2004 was $302,470. The salaries of the Managing Directors are set within the K range indicated in 
the table. 
Executive Board Remuneration 
Upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors' Committee on the Remuneration of Executive 
Directors, the Governors approved the remuneration of Executive Directors and their Alternates effective 
1 July 2004, to be as follows: the remuneration of Executive Directors is $196,730; the remuneration of 
Alternate Executive Directors is $170,170. 
1. In addition, a supplemental allowance of $141,290 is paid to cover expenses. 
2. No supplemental allowance is paid to Managing Directors. 
3. These figures do not apply to the US Executive Director and Alternate Executive Director, who are 
















Representative job title 
A 21,000  27,295  35,480  Office  assistant 
B  27,620  35,910  50,270  Team assistant, information technician 
C  31,650  41,150  57,610  Program assistant, information 
assistant 
D 38,180  49,630  69,480  Senior  program assistant, information 
specialists, budget assistant 
E 48,620  63,200  88,480  Analyst 
F 67,800  88,140  123,400  Professional 
G 88,760  115,390  161,550  Senior  professional 
H 124,150  161,400  217,890  Managers and lead professionals 
I  171,200  214,000  256,800  Directors and senior advisors 
J 216,790  242,800  279,220  Vice  presidents 
K  242,500  271,600  282,460  Managing directors and senior vice 
presidents 
Note:   Because World Bank Group (WBG) staff, other than US citizens, are usually not required to pay 
income taxes on their WBG compensation, the salaries are set on a net-of-tax basis, which is 
generally equivalent to the after-tax take-home pay of the employees of the comparator 
organizations and firms from which WBG salaries are derived. 











maximum  Illustrative position titles 
A1  25,270  37,950  Not applicable (activities at this level have been 
outsourced) 
A2 28,320  42,460  Driver 
A3  31,680  47,560  Staff Assistant (clerical) 
A4  35,490  53,290  Staff Assistant (beginning secretarial) 
A5 39,810  59,710  Staff  Assistant  (experienced secretarial) 
A6  44,480  66,820  Administrative Assistant, other Assistants (for 
example, Computer Systems, Human Resources, 
External Relations) 
A7  49,890  74,870  Research Assistant, Senior Administrative 
Assistant, other Senior Assistants (for example, 
Accounting, Human Resources, External Relations) 
A8  55,880  83,880  Senior Administrative Assistant 
A9  59,410  89,210  Librarian, Translator, Research Officer, Human 
Resources Officer, External Relations Officer 
A10  68,360  102,560  Accountant, Research Officer, Administrative 
Officer 
A11  75,510  117,810  Economist (Ph.D. Entry level), Attorney, Specialist 
(for example, Accounting, Computer Systems, 
Human Resources, External Relations) 
A12 87,910  131,930  Economist,  Attorney, Specialist (for example, 
Accounting, Computer Systems, Human 
Resources, External Relations) 
A13 98,500  147,740  Economist,  Attorney, Specialist (for example, 
Accounting, Computer Systems, Human 
Resources, External Relations) 
A14  110,310  165,490  Deputy Division Chief, Senior Economist 
A15/B1  124,650  187,050  Division Chief, Deputy Division Chief 
B2  143,700  208,520  Division Chief, Advisor 
B3  170,770  222,210  Assistant Department Director 
B4  199,020  248,760  Deputy Department Director, Senior Advisor 
B5 234,350  281,330  Department  Director 
Notes:   Because IMF staff, other than US citizens, are usually not required to pay income taxes on their 
IMF compensation, the salaries are set on a net-of-tax basis, which is generally equivalent to the 
after-tax take-home pay of the employees of the public and private sector firms from which IMF 
salaries are derived. 
  It should be noted that the salary scale corresponds to staff in Washington, DC, as there are few 
people posted abroad. From the same source (IMF 2005: 87), it is indicated that the salary 
structure for senior management as of 1 July 2004, is as follows: Managing Director, 
USD 376,380 (in addition, a supplemental allowance of USD 67,380 is paid to cover expenses); 
First Deputy Managing Director, USD 327,290; Deputy Managing Directors, USD 311,700. 
 1  Grades A1-A8 are support staff; grades A9-A15 are professional staff; and grades B1-B5 are 
managerial staff. 






Distribution of staff by gender at the IMF 
 1980  1990  2004 
1 
Staff No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
                    
All staff  1,444 100.0 1,774 100.0  2,714  100.0
Women 676 46.8 827 46.6  1,246  45.9
Men 768 53.2 947 53.4  1,468  54.1
            
                    
Total support staff 
2 613 100.0 642 100.0  718  100.0
Women 492 80.3 540 84.1  613  85.4
Men 121 19.7 102 15.9  105  14.6
            
                    
Total professional staff 
3 646 100.0 897 100.0  1,633  100.0
Women 173 26.8 274 30.5  579  35.5
Men 473 73.2 623 69.5  1,054  64.5
            
     Total economists  362  100.0 529  100.0  1,008  100.0 
     Women  42 11.6 70 13.2  249  24.7
     Men  320 88.4 459 86.8  759  75.3
            
     Total specialized career streams  284  100.0 368  100.0  625  100.0 
     Women  131 46.1 204 55.4  330  52.8
     Men  153 53.9 164 44.6  295  47.2
            
                    
Total managerial staff 
4 185 100.0 235 100.0  363  100.0
Women 11 5.9 13 5.5  54  14.9
Men 174 94.1 222 94.5  309  85.1
                  
     Total economists  99  100.0 184  100.0  293  100.0 
     Women  4 4.0 9 4.9  31  10.6
     Men  95 96.0 175 95.1  262  89.4
            
                    
     Total specialized career streams  86  100 51  100.0  70  100.0 
     Women  7 8.1 4 7.8  23  32.9
     Men  79 91.9 47 92.2  47  67.1
            
Notes:  
1 Includes only staff on duty: differs from the number of approved positions; 
2 Staff in Grades 
A1-A8; 
3 Staff in Grades A9-A15; 
4 Staff in Grades B1-B5. 
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